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TRUST, CORPORATION AND THE
WORKER
BY LORD WEDDERBURN, F.B.A.*
In this article, Lord Wedderburn provides a detailed examination on the evolu-
tion of the concepts of the trust and the corporation. Focusing on British law, he
explores not only the once strong connection between the two but also delves
into the policy and social issues underlying their operation.
In 1904, F.W. Maitland wrote:
And now let me once more repeat that the connection between Trust and Corpo-
ration is very ancient. It is at least four centuries old."
Both the Trust and the Corporation represent remarkable legal
mechanisms enabling men to manage their affairs at a distance and
behind a defensive wall - through the "corporation," that is a sepa-
rate legal person, and the "trust," the institution created by the Chan-
cellor and the courts of equity which Maitland described as "the most
distinctive feature" of English law and which, Cheshire held, "in the
course of its development has become the axis round which revolve so
many activities of the English speaking people." 2
The two concepts, though independent of one another, have trod-
den paths that intertwine in the history of the common law at least
since the end of the fourteenth century. Both were recognised early by
the Crown for what they were, machineries of the most sophisticated
legal invention with great potential to become alternative centres of
property and, therefore, of power. Such alternative concentrations of
power were not acceptable to the Crown, and in the time of Edward III
we find the rule, which stuck, that it is "only the sovereign who could
make a persona ficta." By 1530, a statute - albeit of short lived effec-
tiveness - prohibited gifts to "bodies without corporation, for a longer
period than twenty years"; and some five years later it was the "ex-
tremely strong-willed King" who "forced upon an extremely unwilling
Parliament" the Statute of Uses to control abuses of the trust.3 From
( Copyright, 1985, Lord Wedderburn.
* Cassel Professor of Commercial Law, London School of Economics in the University of
London. The Falconbridge Lecture in Commercial Law, 18 September 1985.
F.W. Maitland, "Trust and Corporation" in H. Hazeltine, G. Lapsley & P. Winfield, eds.,
Maitland: Selected Essays (1936) 141 at 214.
2 G. Cheshire, Modern Law of Real Property, 1lth ed. by E. Burn (1972) at 4.
3 See W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 3 (1909) at 372-75; and ibid. vol. 4 at
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the very outset the legitimacy of both corporation and of trust was an
issue with the State. Property and power cannot avoid the problem of
legitimacy.
During this period, Government created a form of "medieval col-
lectivism" through joint stock corporations created by charter or letters
patent, "state sanctioned bodies" from which emerged both joint stock
trading and "an inexpensive means by which the Crown could govern
its overseas territories. ' 4 Four centuries later, we find that the trust and
the corporation are now, to use a fashionable idiom, "privatised," even
"deregulated." Restrictions on the use of the trust, in terms of its his-
torical perspective, are relatively few, and in all common law jurisdic-
tions the State has made available to groups of citizens the opportunity
by mere filing or registration to act as a company, or corporation.
Thereby are acquired the two greatest privileges available in the legal
systems of the Western World - incorporation, the right to act as a
corporate "person" separate from the stockholders or controllers; and
limited liability, whereby human beings permitted by the law to take
the full profit are also protected from the full financial liabilities of
their business transactions.
It is of no little interest that judges - at any rate English
judges - today treat the latter (limited liability) as the obvious reason
for the former (incorporation) when historically they are divorced.
Lord Diplock, for example, declared recently:
My Lords, the reason why English statutory law, and that of all other trading
countries, has long permitted the creation of corporations as artificial persons
distinct from their individual shareholders and from that of any other corpora-
tion even though the shareholders of both corporations are identical, is to enable
business to be undertaken with limited financial liability in the event of the busi-
ness proving to be a failure.5
Our judges do occasionally "pierce the veil" of corporate personal-
ity, contrary to the normal principles of the law, and treat the company
as one with its controllers, or as one "person" with the rest of its group
of companies (for though we teach and speak of "company" the reality
of our times is not the "company" but the group of companies). These
decisions of the judges, emanating from the unexpressed, and perhaps
sometimes inexpressible, premises of judicial policy we call "creative"
if we like them and "bad law" if we do not. Contrary to what Kahn-
Freund called the "calamitous" precedent of Salomon v. Salomon,
444; On the Statute of Uses, see ibid. vol. 4 at 461; F.W. Maitland, Equity, ed. by J. Brunyate,
(1936) at 34.
' E. Palmer, D. Prentice & B. Welling, Canadian Company Law (1978) at 29-30.
a Dimbleby & Sons v. N.U.J., [1984] 1 W.L.R. 427 at 435 (H.L.).
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where it was laid down that, like the chartered corporation, the new,
registered "company is at law a different person altogether from the
[shareholders], ' 6 English judges have been slow to "pierce the veil" of
corporate personality. As one judge put it recently,
the trouble with any doctrine which involves disregarding the legal form of trans-
actions and preferring their substance is that once one starts on the process one
does not know when to stop.
7
There is something to be said for this self-conscious constraint upon the
judicial libido, at least when they are compared with the exceptions
such as the final phase in the judicial career of Lord Denning when he
usually made it clear that he had no intention of stopping short of
whatever conclusion he thought to be just and proper, whatever the
legal forms might be.
The strength and omnipresence of the corporate legal "person" in
our law and society today cannot be denied. It is, therefore, worth ask-
ing whether Maitland would still be able to recognise that strong con-
nection between "Trust and Corporation," and how far any such con-
nection relates to the debate about the policies of our company laws,
especially in connection with the different groups of human beings with
whom it comes into contact, whether they are shareholders, directors,
creditors or employees. My aim is to do so by reference mainly to Brit-
ish law and experience, partly because this is the system best within my
knowledge, partly because that system is the common origin of the
many different Commonwealth developments and even, in many re-
spects, of United States legal experience, partly, too, because while the
English legal system illustrates in rather old fashioned ways the link of
which Maitland spoke, there has been less debate about the social is-
sues involved on that side of the Atlantic than on this.
Most observers would not agree with Lord Diplock that, compara-
tively, British law has long permitted corporation with "limited finan-
cial liability" for the shareholders, apart from certain types of
chartered incorporation. Incorporation was known and used for centu-
ries in England long before limited liability was generally available.
Most other European countries have enjoyed widespread use of busi-
ness associations with a limitation upon the participants' liability for
much longer (the socihtg en commandite for instance) and in this re-
spect the British commercial law of 1850 was very backward. It was
6 [1897] A.C. 22 at 51 (H.L.) per Lord Macnaghten; 0. Kahn-Freund, "Some Reflections
on Company Law Reform" (1944) 7 Mod. L. Rev. 54.
7 Shipping Company Uniform Inc. v. International Transport Workers' Federation, [1985]
Ind. Rel. L. Rev. 71 at 75 (Q.B.) per Staughton J.
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not until 1855 that limited liability became available in England for
companies formed by something equivalent to registration. Only then
was the obligation of a gentleman to put his assets to the full behind
his business or trade ventures - for that is what classical partnership
doctrine demanded - commuted into the protected liability which is
treated as normal today. Although chartered corporations had permit-
ted members freedom from corporate debts since the fifteenth century,
most charters allowed the corporations to make "leviations," or calls,
on members to pay for them; and where that was so, the Courts of
Equity in 1671 permitted creditors a direct action against the members,
so that by itself the incorporation gave little more than an "illusory"
limitation of liability. In 1855, limited liability became real8 notwith-
standing the vigorous protests by many at the time. Lord Mounteagle
said limited liability would encourage reckless enterprises and "open
the door to dishonesty and fraud," while Lord Overstone declared in
1856 that this "singularly inappropriate" measure would foster innu-
merable evils:
by giving facility for the widespread introduction of joint stock companies reck-
less in their procedure because protected by limited liability and filling the com-
munity with instruments of gambling in the form of shares upon which little or
nothing has been paid up.9
In England the Law Times in 1858 said the measure had in three years
earned its name of "The Rogues Charter," claiming that "Limited lia-
bility has had a fair trial and has proved an egregious failure for all
good purposes and fertile only of ill."10
In its early years the new limited companies were subjected to
careful control. They had to advertise their status by the word "Lim-
ited" and at least three quarters of the capital had to be subscribed by
25 shareholders who paid up 20 per cent on shares of at least 10
pounds per value. Yet limited liability quickly took a hold in England,
as it had already in the United States where, since their independence,
and more rapidly in the nineteenth century, charters were granted by
the State Assemblies to corporations. An examination of the United
8 Houldsworth, supra note 3, vol. 3 at 484; Salmon v. The Hamborough Company (1671), 1
Chain. Cas. 204 (H.L.) [hereinafter Salmon]; and see L.C.B. Gower, Modern Company Law, 4th
ed. (1979).
9 The Law Times (21 June 1856) at 150; Salmon, ibid. per Lord Mounteagle. One is
tempted to speculate whether Lord Overstone met Mr. Mckenzie in his travels from Upper Can-
ada to England, whose excoriations upon the "evils of limited liability" were to lead to his revolu-
tionary draft constitution of 1873 which aimed to ban "incorporated trading companies", see F.
Labrie & E. Palmer, "The Pre-Confederation History of Corporations in Canada" in J. Ziegel,
ed., Studies in Canadian Company Law (1967) 33 at 51-52.
10 The Law Times (25 March, 1858) 14.
[VOL. 23 No. 2
Trust, Corporation and the Worker
States corporate history reveals the appearance of general incorpora-
tion laws in the year 1811 in New York and in other States increas-
ingly in the 1830's, allowing for incorporation on registration. 1 Many
of these laws included similar controls over corporate life and dealings.
As Justice Brandeis put it, the "enactment of general corporation laws
does not signify that the apprehension of corporate domination had
been overcome. . . ." That apprehension even addled the meaning of
"trust," in its American sense, after John D. Rockefeller showed what
you could do with a shareholding Trust in Standard Oil.
The progressive removal of the "limitations upon the size and pow-
ers of business corporations," Brandeis recounted, was due not only to
the desirability of the relaxation but "to the conviction that it would be
futile to insist upon them; because local restriction would be circum-
vented by foreign incorporation," in what he called the "race of lax-
ity."12 This was the beginning of that long process of regulatory relaxa-
tion, through the New Jersey corporations law of 1896 to the
triumphant Delaware Codes that had led the way throughout this cen-
tury in that "race to the bottom" in American State corporation legis-
lation; a competitive dash for corporate business by offering "do-what-
you-like" laws, albeit now tempered by Federal Securities Laws and
the, at times, more regulatory attitudes of minority States such as New
York and California.' 3 More important to our purpose is the fact that
limited liability was accorded to stockholders in these United States
corporations from the outset. Indeed, there appears to have been little
or no resistance in the United States to the introduction of limited lia-
bility, none parallel to that which persisted in England after the Bubble
Act 1720, until it fell away when the Limited Liability Act was passed
at the height of the Crimean War in 1855 in what is still an unsolved
historical mystery."4 There are those - and Maitland himself was
among them - who believed that, even without legislation, the ingenu-
n E.M. Dodd, "The First Half Century of Statutory Regulation of Business Corporations in
Massachusetts" in Harvard Legal Essays (1934) 65; J. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of
American Corporations (1917); A. Levy, Private Corporations and Their Control, vol. 1 (1950)
at 103-15 and 146-55; H. Ballantine, Corporations (1946) at 10-67.
12 L.K. Liggett Co v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 at 548-51 (1933); see W. Cary, "Federalism and
Corporate Law" (1974) 83 Yale L.J. 663; see also New Jersey Corporate Law Revision Commis-
sion, Report (1968).
" See H.J. Friendly, "In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law" (1964)
39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 384 at 413; H.G. Manne, "Our Two Corporation Systems" (1967) 53 Va. L.
Rev. 259; W. Cary, ibid.; S. Arsht, "Reply to Professor Cary" (1976) 31 Bus. Lawyer 1113; L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Reglation (1983) at 29-38. See also M. Eisenberg, The Struc-
ture of the Corporation (1976); J. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the
United States (1970) esp. at 30-74.
14 See Gower, supra note 8 at 43-46.
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ity of equity lawyers could have brought about limited liability for
those who put capital into the unincorporated "deed of settlement com-
panies" that were the vehicle by which British business evaded the
Bubble Act's prohibition against acting as a body corporate, between
1720 and 1844. Essentially, this involved property held by trustees and
managed by directors. It was a trust to which the proprietors would
subscribe their money, being in the eye of the common law "partners"
(with full liability) in the enterprise, 15 but with the crucial advantage
of transferable "shares" (or in eighteenth century terminology "ac-
tions"). The addition of contractual clauses provided for limited liabil-
ity for the proprietors for it was thought that: "If the State had not
given way, we should have had in England joint-stock companies, unin-
corporated, but contracting with limited liability. 16
However, the State did give way, or rather was forced to do so.
The monumental advantage of limited liability was permitted and com-
pany registrations boomed. Already, the deed of settlement companies
"in the new commercial and industrial conditions, were being formed in
ever increasing numbers. ' 17 In perhaps the last period in which British
capital can be said to have concentrated on investment at home rather
than abroad, some 2,500 new incorporations appeared on the register
between 1856 and 1862; and if that sounds a small number compared
with 949,903 private, and 6,508 public companies on the British regis-
ter in 1983, studies have shown that it represented at the time a mas-
sive quantity of investment and in particular, represented investment
increasingly in industrial companies. 8 Proponents of the new system
claimed that it was needed for the "men with small capitals," those of
the "Middle and Working Classes." ' They should be allowed a "fair
opportunity" in the market. Yet, the small shareholder was remote
from the outset of the limited company. The function of the 1855 Act
was to provide a safer and more flexible mechanism for investment by
capital as a whole. The economic system demanded better mechanisms
for investment and the legal system - as it always does, even if belat-
edly - gave way. Rather mournfully Maitland recognised the realities
15 A. DuBois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act (1938).
16 Maitland, supra note I at 210, the American example at 212. The courts in fact accepted
this round-about method in respect of shareholders in some insurance companies and American
"trust deeds" had used the same device.
'7 Holdsworth, supra note 3, vol. 13 at 370; C. Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company
(1950) at ch. 10.
18 See H. Shannon, "The Coming of General Limited Liability" (1931-32) 11 Econ. Hist.
Rev. 267 at 290 and "The First 5,000 Limited Companies" ibid. 421.
19 V.K. Select Committee, "Investments for Savings of the Middle and Working Classes" in
Parl. Papers, vol. 19 (1850) at 169.
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when he commented on the so-called legal personality of these new cor-
porate entities:
man thinks of his [unincorporated] club as a living being ... while the joint-
stock company is only a sort of machine into which he puts money and out of
which he draws dividends.20
The continued prohibition on generalised limited liability in Eng-
land until such a late date, and the manner in which it was apparently
wrung from the legislature as a concession, are facts of some impor-
tance to more recent company law developments. It must surely be of
importance in Canada that the socitg en commandite and the incorpo-
ration of limited partnerships were well-known in the 1840s, and that
even before the great general incorporation Act of 1850 for joint stock
companies by mere filing in manufacturing and other industries, the
principle of limited liability "had been conceded in company Acts for
many years." 2' Comparison between British and Canadian company
and commercial legal development proves useful in terms of the rich
contributions from the Canadian courts, but one must take account of
the different origins for as Wegenast reminds us, by:
a strange turn of legislative history, we find the British Parliament in 1862
adopting the method of incorporation by registration, which had been devised in
the American Colonies after the Revolution because of the lack of the Royal
prerogative while two years later the Canadian Parliament designs its own sys-
tem based on the original common law method of incorporation by letters
patent.22
In England, the desire to regulate the affairs of this new corporate
person on the legal stage had many sources: the ancient links between
chartered corporations and "monopolies," the experiences of the Bub-
ble period; and the old distrust of limited liability. This was not wholly
new to the legislature, for it was the judges who attempted in 1875 to
provide protection for investors and creditors by insisting upon the ul-
tra vires doctrine and confining the limited company to the objects set
out in its memorandum. The company must be limited to this capacity
said Lord Hatherley because,
this Act was passed with a view to enabling persons to carry on business on
principles which were up to that time wholly unknown in the general conduct of
mercantile affairs in this country ... the general principle of partnership was
that every person entering into any partnership whatsoever thereby subjected,
before this description of legislation had been entered upon, the whole of his
property, whatsoever it might be, to the demands of his creditors .... The
20 Maitland, supra note 1 at 201.
21 Labrie & Palmer, supra note 9 at 57.
22 F.W. Wegenast, The Law of Canadian Companies (1931) at iii, 21.
1985]
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Legislature said: you may. . . form yourselves into a company, but in doing that
you must tell all who may be disposed to deal with you the objects for which you
have been associated. They will trust to that memorandum of association .... 11
In this way, it was thought, the investor could have confidence that
he knew the venture in which he was investing and the creditor could
know to what manner of enterprise he was lending. The restriction of
ultra vires as an effective social mechanism has, of course, long ago
been cast aside. First by the draftsmen who by prolix language gave to
companies every object they could think of in their objects clause al-
lowing all activities which the directors decide to undertake, secondly
either by objective phrases such as "all kinds of operations . . . as an
individual capitalist may lawfully undertake" or by subjective objects
clauses (now accepted by English courts), and thirdly, in part, by legis-
lation necessitated by the entry of the United Kingdom into the com-
mon market.24 In many Commonwealth jurisdictions the matter has
been settled by statute in favour of the company's having all, or virtu-
ally all, "the rights, powers and privileges" and the capacities of a nat-
ural person.25 From the United States, Professors Cary and Eisenberg
tell us: "Ultra vires was the expression of a social policy that failed."2
Yet English judges still pursue its purpose. "You cannot" said Harman
L.J. in 1970, "have an object to do every mortal thing you want be-
cause that is to have no object at all."'27 In 1985, the Court of Appeal
affirmed the ultra vires doctrine, though reconstructing it in terms of a
straightforward interpretation of the objects clause, rightly putting
aside cases of abuse of corporate powers as involving not corporate ca-
pacity but breach of the directors' fiduciary duties. In so doing,
Browne-Wilkinson L.J. said:
In my judgment, for this purpose the position of a company is analogous to that
of a human being who has fiduciary powers. If two trustees convey trust property
in breach of trust, the conveyance is not void. As human beings they have the
capacity to transfer the legal estate; their capacity to transfer flows from their
status as human beings not from the powers conferred on them as trustees ....
2S Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche (1875), 7 L.R. (H.L.) 653; see also Cot-
man v. Brougham, [1918] A.C. 514 at 520 per Lord Parker.
1' Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall Properties Ltd., [1966] 2 Q.B. 656 (C.A.); K.W. Wcdder-
burn, "The Death of Ultra Vires?" (1966) 29 Mod. L.R. 673; R. Baxt, "Is the Doctrine of Ultra
Vires Dead?" (1971) 20 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 301: Newstead v. Frost, [1980] i W.L.R. 135 (H.L.);
B.G. Pettet, "Unlimited Objects Clauses?" (1981) 97 Law Q. Rev. 15; and European Communi-
ties Act 1972 (U.K.), 1972, c. 68, s. 9 [now Companies Act 1985 (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 35].
25 Australian Uniform Companies Act s.19 & Schedule 3; Canadian Model Business Corpo-
rations Act, 1975, s.15.
2 W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Corporations: Cases and Materials, 5th ed. (1980) at 38.
27 In Re Introductions Ltd., [1970] Ch. 199 at 209 (C.A.) [meaning, of course, a stated
"object" in terms of (now) the Companies Act, 1985, supra note 24, s. 2(1)(c)].
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So in the case of a limited company, if a transaction falls within the objects of
the company (and is therefore within its capacity) it is effective to vest rights in
a third party even if the transation was carried out in excess or abuse of the
powers of the company .... However, the analogy between companies and
trustees is not complete. As an artificial person, a company can only act by duly
authorised agents. . . . If the transaction is beyond the capacity of the company
it is in any event a nullity and wholly void.28
Slade L.J. said tersely: "The legal personality of a company incor-
porated under the Companies Acts exists only for the purpose of its
incorporation, as defined in the objects clause," though he then pro-
ceeded, for ten more pages, to place the previous precedents in proper
order. But the appeal to trust doctrines went further in these judg-
ments, and they take us to another central issue of the trust-corpora-
tion inquiry; one that is nearer to some explosive social issues of mod-
ern life, instead of an uncharacteristic meander through the pleasant
pastures of remote legal history.
One may focus on that issue by noting that the trust relationship
was rejected by our law in a very important respect. Unlike the
chartered corporation of the eighteenth century where the corporation
was treated as a trustee for its members,29 the corporation of today is
not seen as holding its assets in trust for the shareholders. Notwith-
standing the Court of Appeal's attempt in 1895 to hold that the boot-
manufacturing company owned by Mr. Salomon through the share-
holdings of himself, his wife and his five children who had pressed him
to give them shares - "They trouble me," he said, "all the while" -
should be treated as his agent or "trustee for him - a trustee improp-
erly brought into existence" because it was, in effect, still a one man
business, the House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal. It was the
denial that this approach was permissible which gave the decision its
importance, not some abstract speculation about corporate veils.30 The
denial of that trust-relationship and the consequent affirmation of the
independent personality of the company in full ownership of its own
property in which shareholders have no direct proprietary interest, be-
ing left to the rights attaching to their shares, set our law off on the
path of private or "closed" one-man companies.31 Had the Court of
28 Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd. v. British Steel Corporation, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 908
at 954 (C.A.) per Slade L.J. [hereinafter Rolled Steel Ltd.]. See also, Re Horsley & Weight Ltd.,
[1982] Ch. 442 (C.A.); and L. Sealey, Cases and Materials in Company Law (1985) at 105.
29 Child v. Hudson's Bay Co. (1723), 2 P. Wms 207, 24 E.R. 702; and see Townsend v. Ash
(1745), 3 Atk. 336, 26 E.R. 995.
30 Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323 (C.A.) rev'd [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.).
21 Short v. Treasury Commissioners, [1948] K.B. 116 at 122 per Evershed L.J., aff'd [1948]
A.C. 534; Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2), [1982] Ch. 204 at
224 (C.A.) [hereinafter Prudential Assurance Co.J.
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Appeal been upheld, the law, and not least the law of corporate taxa-
tion, would have taken a very different shape.
I. THE DIRECTORS AS FIDUCIARIES
The eye of equity had long identified more important targets. If
the corporation was not a trustee for the shareholders or the control-
lers, were not the controllers, especially the directors, the equivalent of,
or something like trustees for the corporation? Even in the days of the
unincorporated "deed of settlement" company, directors had been
made liable for breach of trust, and in one instance the trustees them-
selves escaped liability for the improper expenditure of funds because
they had been coerced by the directors.32 Dr. Sealy has shown that the
courts were well aware of the distinction between the trustees proper
and the managing directors of these associations; directors did not ac-
quire these modern "fiduciary" duties because they were the trustees,
but rather because they had accepted an appointment of "trust" and
were accountable for "breaches of trust." "In the limited legal vocabu-
lary of the day, there was no other word which the judges would wish
to use."33
The roots of this usage lay largely in chartered corporations, where
directors were subjected to trust-like duties as early as 1742, and in
companies incorporated under special Acts of Parliament. 34 One of the
latter was the 1843 decision of Foss v Harbottle,35 in which sharehold-
ers in a company incorporated by statute were not permitted to sue the
directors because their breach of duties using powers "entrusted" to
them for the corporate good should be remedied by legal action
brought by the company. Directors owe their duties to the company,
not to each shareholder, and "the corporation might elect to adopt the
32 Benson v. Heathorn (1842), 1 Y & C.C.C. 326, 62 E.R. 909; Grimes v. Harrison (1859),
26 Beav. 435, 53 E.R. 966.
11 L.S. Sealy, "The Director as Trustee" [1967] Cambridge L.J. 83 at 85; and his discussions
in "Fiduciary Relationships" [1962] Cambridge L.J. 69 at 70-72 and "Some Principles of Fiduci-
ary Obligation" [1963] Cambridge L.J. 119.
3 Charitable Corporation v. Sutton (1742), 2 Atk. 400, 26 E.R. 642; A.G. v. Wilson (1840),
Cr. & Ph. 1, 41 E.R. 389; Mayor of Colchester v. Lowten (1813), 1 V. & B. 226, 35 E.R. 89;
York and North-Midland Railway Co. v. Hudson (1845), 16 Beav. 485, 51 E.R. 866.
" (1843), 2 Hare 461, 67 E.R. 189 (Wigram VC); see K.W. Wedderburn, "Shareholders'
Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle" [1957] Cambridge L.J. 93; and "Derivative Actions
and Foss v. Harbottle" (1981) 44 Mod. L. Rev. 202; S. Beck, "An Analysis of Foss v. Harbottle"
in Ziegel, supra note 9, vol. I at ch. 18. The Shareholders' Derivative Action (1974) 52 Can, Bar
Rev. 159; R. Gregory "The Section 20 Contract" (1981) 44 Mod. L. Rev. 526; D. Goldberg, "The
Enforcement of Outsider-Rights under Section 20(1) of the Companies Act 1948" (1972) 35
Mod. L. Rev. 362; B. Rider, "Amiable Lunatics and the Rule in Foss v.Harbottle" [1978] Cam-
bridge L.J. 270; C. Baxter, "The Role of the Judge in Enforcing Shareholders' Rights" [1983]
Cambridge L.J. 96.
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transaction." Although this decision is rejected by some Canadian writ-
ers and "relegated to limbo without compunction," 36 and despite being
dubbed by Dr. Sealy as "140 years' accumulation of procedural cod-
swallop," 37 Foss v. Harbottle remains fundamental to English company
law, albeit our law has slowly - very slowly to Canadian eyes - al-
lowed for a shareholders' "derivative" action to call the errant directors
to account. The principle, say the English judges,
is not merely a tiresome procedural obstacle placed in the path of a shareholder
by a legalistic judiciary. The rule is the consequence of the fact that a corpora-
tion is a separate legal entity.38
Some duties placed upon directors are trustee's duties, namely
where they actually possess the assets of the company and are treated
as "constructive trustees." The 1894 statement of the principle has
been repeatedly approved:
A limited company is of course not a trustee of its own funds, it is their benefi-
cial owner; but in consequence of the fiduciary character of their duties the di-
rectors of a limited company are treated as if they were trustees of those funds of
the company which are in their banks or under their control and if they misapply
them they commit a breach of trust.39
This liability is strict. The director is liable, good motive or bad, to
restore company property misapplied, whether ultra vires or intra vires,
in breach of the articles, and the company may be able to reach its
property even in the hands of third parties who took with sufficient
notice from directors that "abused their fiduciary duties" by breaking
the "constructive trust. '40
However, where the directors are not dealing with corporate prop-
erty, they are beset with "fiduciary" duties, duties not exactly those of
a trustee (that would be impossible because they are not here possessed
of property on which to impress the trust) but analogous to those of the
trustee. Thus the director must not put himself in a position where his
interest and his duty conflict:
It is a rule of universal application, that no one, having such duties to discharge,
shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he had, or can have, a per-
sonal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of
36 R. Dickerson, J. Howard & L. Getz, Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for
Canada (1971) at 482; quoted in Sealy, supra note 28 at 438.
37 L. Sealy, "Foss v. Harbottle - A Marathon Where Nobody Wins" [1981] Cambridge
L.J. 29 at 31.
Prudential Assurance Co., supra note 31 at 224.
'9 In Re Lands Allotment Co., [1894] 1 Ch. 616 at 638; Belmont Finance Corp. v. Williams
Furniture Ltd. (No. 2), [1980] 1 All E.R. 393 at 405 (C.A.)
40 Rolled Steel Ltd., supra note 28 at 949. See also International Sales and Agencies Ltd. v.
Marcus, [1982] 3 All E.R. 551 (Q.B.); Steen v. Law, [1964] A.C. 287.
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those whom he is bound to protect.41
If, therefore, he receives a benefit or payment arising from the execu-
tion of his office, and that payment has not been approved either in
advance or subsequently by the company (here acting by shareholders'
meeting) the director (in principles that reach back to the eighteenth
century and beyond) stands in breach of his "trustee-like" fiduciary
duties. It makes no difference that he may be quite innocent, receiving
his benefit in all good faith to help the company along in a transaction,
and the company which claims that he must acount for his profit may
now be controlled by the hands of a take-over bidder who is the last
person to whom conventional morality would award it, as in Regal
(Hastings) Ltd. v Gulliver."2 In a classic judgement, Laskin J. (as he
then was) said such a "fiduciary relationship . . . betokens loyalty,
good faith and avoidance of a conflict of duty and self interest," and he
applied to senior management, as well as to directors on the board, the
prohibition against obtaining "secretly or without approval of the com-
pany (which would have to be properly manifested upon full disclosure
of the facts) any property or business advantage" of or for the com-
pany, including any "maturing business opportunity," whether or not
the company would have acquired it or made use of it. That duty, he
declared, relying upon a judgment of Lord Eldon in 1803,'4 follows
them after they have departed from the business.
In real life, most of these duties are made tolerable for the direc-
tors (and senior managers) by reason of their waiver in advance or by
subsequent ratification after their breach. A resolution in the share-
holders' meeting is not normally a matter of difficulty for the board of
directors. (I leave aside - somewhat reluctantly - the problem be-
loved of all company law students: which breaches of which duties can-
not be waived or ratified?) 44 It is clear law that the shareholders, usu-
ally when acting by ordinary majority, certainly when acting
4' Aberdeen Railway v. Blaikie (1854), 1 Macqo. H. L. 461 at 471-72 (H.L.) (emphasis
added).
42 Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1942] 1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.) [hereinafter Regal].
43 Canadian Aero Services Ltd. v. O'Malley (1974), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter Canadian Aero]; see also Industrial Development Consultants v. Cooley, [1972] 1 W.LR.
443; Cook v. Deeks, [1961] A.C. 554; Abbey Glen Property Corp. v. Stumborg (1978), 85 D.L.R.
(3d) 35 (Alta. C.A.); Consul Development Property Ltd. v. DPC Estates Property Ltd. (1975), 49
A.J.L.R. 74; Weber Feeds Ltd. v. Weber (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 176 (Ont. C.A.).
" See Gower, supra note 8 at 579-602. On the special problem of how far s.205 Companies
Act, 1948 (U.K.), 1948, c. 38 (Companies Act 1985, supra note 24, s.310) permits waiver, see
Gower, ibid. at 585, 601; J. Birds, "The Permissible Scope of Articles Excluding the Duties of
Company Directors" (1976) 39 Mod. L. Rev. 394; R. Gregory, "The Scope of the Companies Act
1948, Section 205" (1982) 98 Law Q. Rev. 413, and the powerful reply by R. Instone, "The Scope
of the Companies Act 1948, Section 205" (1982) 98 Law Q. Rev. 548.
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unanimously, can approve and validate the intra vires acts of manage-
ment, at least where no direct misappropriation of corporate property is
concerned. In a remarkable example of the mystification accomplished
by the law, the Court of Appeal applied that doctrine, as it was applied
to Aaron Salomon and his troublesome family (able members of which
had approved the dealings in that case of 1897), to the approval given
to directors of a subsidiary company by its three shareholders, which
were three giant multinational oil companies. By their unanimous ap-
proval all breach of duty and negligence was cured, thereby depriving
creditors of any chance of recouping some of the 75 million pounds in
losses caused by the crash of the subsidiary.45 If we ask what is the
nature of the "trustee-like" fiduciary duty, we must also ask why can it
be so easily waived.
Despite the regular waiver of fiduciary obligations, not least in the
articles of association in advance, judges have felt a pressure to relax
the very duties themselves. The fiduciary duties must not be too strict
for directors, they say, for that "might fetter their action to an extent
which would be exceedingly disadvantageous to the company they re-
present." In the leading case which confirmed that directors will not
normally be liable for negligence if they act honestly in accordance
with their own (subjective) skill and experience (subject to any contrac-
tual duties attaching to them as executives) Romer J. said, in 1925,
that they stand in a "fiduciary relationship to the company" but to say
they are trustees "by way of analogy of what [their] duties are" is
"wholly misleading." 46 This was in the context of the rule that direc-
tors are not as such obliged to attend to the company's affairs, and they
may rely upon those to whom management is delegated, unless put on
notice that all is not well. 47 Australian and New Zealand courts have
responded to commercial need by loosening the bonds of the basic prin-
ciple that a director may not in advance fetter his discretion owed to
the company.4 8 Moreover, judges have permitted directors to sit on the
boards of competing companies (though not of course to transmit confi-
" Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Ser-
vices Co. Ltd., [1983] Ch. 258; see K. W. Wedderburn, "Multinationals and the Antiquities of
Company Law" (1984) 47 Mod. L. Rev. 87. See also, Re Horsley and Weight Ltd., [1982] Ch.
442; P. Davies, "Companies, In General" [1983] J. Bus. L. 243; K.W. Wedderburn, "Ultra Vires
in Modern Company Law" (1983) 46 Mod. L. Rev. 204.
46 See respectively Re Faure Electric Accumulator Co. (1886), 40 Ch. D. 141 at 151 per
Kay J.; In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., [1925] Ch. 407 at 426 (C.A.).
47 Dovey v. Corey, [1901] A.C. 577; The Marquis of Bute's Case, [1982] 2 Ch. 100.
48 See Thorley v. Goldberg (1965), 112 C.L.R. 597 (Aust. H.C.); Kevin v.Clark, [1962]
N.S.W.R. 686 (nominee director); Berlei Hestia (NZ) Ltd. v. Fernyhough, [1980] 2 N.Z.L.R.
150 (S.C.) [hereinafter Berlei Hestia] (joint venture); Clark v. Workman, [1920] Iv. R. 107.
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dences from one to the other); a practice that would not be permitted
to all other fiduciaries, and one which continues, even though both
Lord Denning and Professor Beck have frowned upon it, the first
before, the second after the Canaero judgement of 1974.49 In these and
similar judgments, the courts are forced to take account of the fact that
directors are not a clear, qualified category; they are not, to use the
untranslatable French word, recognisably a cadre. There is no "reason-
able director" in the Clapham taxi cab. They range from the modern
Aaron Salomon sleeves pulled up at the boot bench but managing di-
rector of his thrusting, one-man enterprise, through to the executive
who enjoys corporate fringe benefits to double his living standard, per-
haps still further to the type of director sought in an advertisement in
the London Times of 1958, "Titled Person required to add distinction
to the board of a Wine Company. No participation or investment re-
quired. Firm very sound."
Even more important, the judges from time to time take acount of
the fact that directors (and senior managers) are businessmen. The
United States judiciary has led the race in applying the "business judg-
ment" principle, to water down the fiduciary principle, together with
the test of "fairness" to oust technical rules. 0 There are voices gradu-
ally becoming louder in England, arguing for a relaxation of duties
which entangle the "director as business man,""' where courts "should
not venture in the determination of what are essentially managerial de-
cisions. ' ' 52 Indeed, writers have begun to argue that all corporate regu-
lation should be decreased and that changes forced upon British com-
pany law by Directives of the European Economic Community be
resisted (many of which are, it is true, obscure and are wholly inapt for
our system - things got so bad in 1984 that two Directives on listing
of securities were printed verbatim as Schedules to an Order for the
not very good reason that no two company lawyers can agree what they
mean).53 Dr. Sealy has called for our company law to aim no longer at
"' London and Mashonaland Exploration Co. v. New Mashonaland Corpn. Co., [1981]
W.N. 165; SCWS Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324 at 367 per Lord Denning; S. Beck, "The
Quickening of the Fiduciary Obligation" (1975) 53 Can. Bar Rev. 771 at 788-92, citing Re
Thompson, [1930] 1 Ch. 203 (trustee opening a competing business is a breach of trust).
50 Cary & Eisenberg, supra note 26 at 563-712; S. Beck, "Corporate Opportunity Revisted"
in Ziegel, supra note 9, vol. 2 at n. 184; V. Brudney, "The Independent Director - Heavenly
City or Petemkin Village?" (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597, at 607-616.
11 T. Hadden's preference of Lindgren v. L&P Estates Ltd., [1968] Ch. 572 to Regal, supra
note 42 - is one of the more reasonable demands: Company Law and Capitalism, 2d ed. (1977)
at 233-239.
" Rider, supra note 35 at 287.
Stock Exchange (Listing) Regulations, 1984 S.I. No. 716. Professor Gower is of the view
that they have repealed the law that stemmed from the Directors' Liability Act, 1890 (U.K.) 1890
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regulation but to be true "enabling acts," to "authorize business men to
organise and operate their businesses," and to keep disclosure down to
"an information service." No one interested in "business and entrepre-
neurship" would put company law in the hands of "chancery men
whose preoccupation during the greater part of their professional time
is with avoiding risks."54 In 1985, he offered the fact that 457,000 com-
panies are in default with their obligation to file accounts, most of
which fail to make their annual returns, as proof that it is time to scrap
the "dead wood," "mumbo jumbo" and "out-dated routines" in the 747
sections and 25 schedules of the Companies Act 1985, at any rate for
small companies; "pointless demands" like financial reporting and com-
pulsory audit should be abolished for smaller companies, and company
law "decriminalised" in such areas as non-disclosure of directors'
interests.
The manner in which British securities law has recently been han-
dled must give great heart to this school of thought. It is now more
than a year and a half since Professor Gower's very modest proposals
for new, effective "self-regulatory agencies" (the idea of a statutory
regulatory Commission was his first preference, but he wished to be
''evolutionary or cautious") when he warned that unless action was
taken "further serious scandals undermining public and international
confidence are ... inevitable."5 5 The Government has published a
White Paper and is setting up two "Self-Regulatory Agencies" in a
structure which is satisfying few and which meets scarcely any of the
challenges with which the City of London is beset, least of all the fun-
damental pressures that have arisen largely from the internationalisa-
tion of capital markets.5 6 What is strange though is the complete ab-
c. 64, i.e. ss. 43, 44 Companies Act, 1948, supra note 44 (now Companies Act 1985, supra, note
24, ss.67-70; Review of Investor Protection: Report Part 11 (1985) at 50-51. Unless this is put
right, it will be the biggest piece of deregulation achieved by stealth. It seems doubtful whether, as
Gower asserts, the Government is committed to change by Financial Services in the U.K., (Cmnd.
9532, 1985) at c. 13.
L. Sealy, "A Company Law for Tomorrow's World" (1981) 2 Co. Law. 195; see on dis-
closure, "The Disclosure Philosophy" (1981) 2 Co. Law 51 at 56; and his address to the Institute
of Directors, Financial Times (18 July 1985). For a different view see T. Hadden, "Fraud in the
City" (1980) 1 Co. Law 9; K.W. Wedderburn, "Information et Responsabilit~s des Adminis-
trateurs" (1981) 4. Rev. Int. de Droit Compar 927.
" Review of Investor Protection Report Part I (Cmnd. 9125, 1984) at para. 12-02; see T.
Hurst, "Self Regulation Versus Legal Regulation" (1984) 5 Co. Law 161 at 170 (on internation-
alisation of the City).
56 Financial Services in the U.K., supra note 53. The choice of two agencies, the Securities
and Investment Board and the Marketing of Investments Board, to supervise such existing bodies
as the Stock Exchange, has been widely criticised: See Financial Times (3, 20 & 26 July & 19
August 1985). The City Take-Over Panel has decided to stay "independent". The pressure for
change within the Stock Exchange has already brought about the impending end of fixed commis-
sions and the 'single capacity' broker and jobber system, as well as exemption for the Stock Ex-
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sence of any comprehensive debate about the nature of our company
law. It is here that the trust re-enters the story.
In his 1975 article on "The Quickening of Fiduciary Obligation,"
Professor Beck stuck his flag firmly in the camp of fiduciary obligation;
a duty "commensurate with the needs of an ever-expanding, ever more
complex corporate economy," but nevertheless involving the "strict ap-
plication against directors and senior management officials." This, Las-
kin J. had said:
is simply recognition of the degree of control which their positions give them in
corporate operations, a control which rises above day to day accountability to
owning shareholders and which comes under scrutiny only at annual general or
at special meetings. It is a necessary supplement, in the public interest, of statu-
tory regulation and accountability which themselves are, at one and the same
time, an acknowledgement of the importance of the corporation in the life of the
community and of the need to compel obedience by it and by its promoters, di-
rectors and managers to norms of exemplary behaviour."5
7
Professor Beck expressed similar views two years earlier when he
said that "the realities of the governance of the modern corporation
require that Equity's severity continue to be applied to corporate direc-
tors.15 8 The answers to such concerns as given by those who insist that
business managers are not trustees or even analogous to trustees is that
these standards are wrongheaded:
Trustees do not maximize profit in the context of the competitive market. They
do not concern themselves with innovation in products. . . trustees need not fear
that beneficiaries may sell their interest to entrepreneurs who will install new
trustees.59
There is much to be said for this insistence that entrepreneurs are risk-
takers out for profit. Trustees are risk-avoiders - careful, cautious,
"chancery" men - out for the best return on investment. Moreover,
for the most part, "trustees are not chosen by someone familiar with
market workings who readily change trustees if dissatisfied." 60 Indeed,
our legal system insists that trustees of pension funds must not,
Megarry J. recently told National Union of Mineworkers' trustees on
the employer's pension fund, demand an investment policy confined to
change from competition legislation, Restrictive Trade Practices (Stock Exchange) Act, 1984
(which will be extended to the self regulatory agencies: Financial Services in the U.K. op. cit.,
para. 8.8). On the emergent conflicts of interest in the new City institutions see Financial Times
(6 June, 16 July &15 August 1984).
57 Canadian Aero, supra note 43 at 384 (emphasis added).
" Beck, supra note 50 at 202.
59 R. Winter, Government and the Corporation (1978) at 33.
1o W. Bishop & D. Prentice "Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Fiduciary Remunera-
tion" (1983) 46 Mod. L. Rev. 289 at 293.
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home, as against overseas industries and "designed to ensure the gen-
eral prosperity of coal mining." The rules of equity oblige them to con-
sider the "benefit of all the bebeficiaries" more widely (some were re-
tired from the industry). "Whatever the position today, nobody can say
that tomorrow cannot possibly make it advantageous to invest in one of
the [investments authorised by the trust outside British industry] ."61
This decision, following the discovery that pension funds do not operate
in any manner different from other institutional investors and are
largely under the control of the employer's financial advisers, was the
final nail in the coffin that buried the claim by Drucker and others that
the great pension funds had heralded the dawn of a more democratic,
even socialist, capitalism.6 2
The ownership of shares in Britain by institutions as compared to
individuals has increased sharply in the last three decades. Institutions
increased their share of equities to 54 per cent in 1981, compared with
only 30 per cent in 1959, while the Stock Exchange gave the figure for
"individual" share ownership in 1983 as 35 per cent whereas twenty
years before it was 59 per cent.63 This is, of course, part of the rapidity
of capital concentration in Britain and internationally in which, though
a centre of "latent power," the institutional investor has not exercised
power over management. Indeed, the model on which English Com-
pany law was built has long been dead, if it ever existed - the "city
state" of active shareholders to whom the elected directorate is regu-
larly accountable." Even in 1945, the Cohen Committee on Company
Law noted the growth of "investment trust companies and unit trusts"
and "the illusory nature of the control theoretically exercised by share-
holders over directors. . .accentuated by the dispersion of capital."6 5
61 Cowan v. Scargill, [1984] I.R.L.R. 260 (Ch.D.) at 269 [hereinafter Cowan]; see the con-
vincing criticism by R. Nobles, "Pensions: Investment Policies and Trustees' Duties - Cowan v.
Scargill" (1984) 13 Indus. L.J. 167. Pension funds own 30 per cent of British listed shares: Sun-
day Times 20 May 1984. See also R. Nobles "Conflict of Interest in Trustees Management of
Pension Funds" (1985) 14 Indus. L.J. 1.
62 See R. Minns, Pension Funds and British Capitalism (1980); P. Drucker The Unseen
Revolution (1976).
63 'Wilson' Report on Financial Institutions (Cmnd. 7937, 1980) at para. 250 ff. & Appen-
dix 3; Central Statistical Office, Studies in Official Statistics No. 34 (1979); A. Johnson, The
City Take-Over Code (1980) at 120; C. Feinstein & J. Revell, The (London) Times, (23 June
1960); J. Moyle, The Pattern of Ordinary Share Ownership (1971); Stock Exchange Year Book
(1983-84) at 924; J. Farrar & M. Russell "The Impact of Institutional Investment in Company
Law" (1984) 5 Co. Law. 107; R. Briston & R. Dobbins, The Growth and Impact of Institutional
Investors (1983) at 4. L. Loss records that of securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
institutional ownership grew from 8.5 per cent in 1979: supra note 13 at 4, n. 17.
" M. Pickering, "Shareholders' Voting Rights and Company Control" (1965) 81 Law Q.
Rev. 248; K. Midgley, Companies and Their Shareholders (1975).
6 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmnd 6659, 1945) at paras. 7,
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However the shareholders do remain "owners." They "are not trustees
for one another, and unlike directors they occupy no fiduciary posi-
tion. . . .The 'company as a whole' is a corporate entity consisting of
all the shareholders. 6 In theory the shareholders are still the ultimate
controllers. Indeed, in spelling out the basic duty of directors, English
law has always taken a position to which Winter and the market-school
can hardly object. Directors must act "bonafide in what they consider,
not what a court may consider, is in the interests of the company. '0 7
The interests of "the company," it is said are "of present and future
members of the Company ... [balancing] a long term view against
short term interests of present members." ' It is true, that judges occa-
sionally allow the interests of the creditors to enter,69 but basically the
directors must consider shareholders' interests directly, albeit the indi-
rect impact of other interests is allowed but, in the classical model,
they will be corrected by the court if they prefer the interests of any
others, the employees for example.70 Modern British statute law con-
firms this model, for when in 1980, Parliament required directors to
have regard to "the interests of the company's employees in general as
well as the interests of its members," it also made it clear that in order
to give them a power in special cases to donate funds to employees, or
former employees, of the company, it needed to give them dispensation
for acting "not in the best interests of the company." To make the
point even clearer, the legislature felt obliged to require that the funds
be taken from profits available for distribution and then subject the
process to approval by shareholders in the general meeting.71 On a long
term view, Company law is still based on the overall duty of directors
to maximise profits for shareholders.7 2
24. See also Jenkins' Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) 38-39 at para.
105.
" Peters' American Delicacy Co. Ltd. v. Heath (1939), 61 C.L.R. 451 at 504, 512, per
Dixon J. (Aust. H. Ct.)
67 In Re Smith and Fawcett, [1942] Ch. 304 at 306, per Greene M.R.
"8 M. Holland Q.C., Investigation into Savoy Hotel Ltd., and Berkeley Hotel Ltd. (1954) at
16; see L.C.B. Gower, "Corporate Control: The Battle for Berkely" (1954-55) 68 Harv. L. Rev.
1176.
" Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 627 at 634; possibly only in insolvency, A. Boyle
and J. Birds Company Law (1983) at 575.
70 Parke v. Daily News, [1962] Ch. 927.
71 Companies Act, 1980 (U.K.), 1980, c. 22, ss. 46(1), 74(1), (2), (3), (6a). Companies Act
1985, supra, note 24, ss.309(1), 719(1), (2), (3); D. Prentice, Companies Act 1980 (1980) ch.17
at 137-43; R. Pennington, The Companies Acts 1980 and 1981 (1983) at 242.
72 The point remains the same even if one adopts the more modest object of "satisfacing"
profits on the theory of the firm elaborated by such writers as R. Marris, The Economic Theory of
Managerial Capitalism (1964); on which see E. Herman Corporate Control, Corporate Power
(1981) ch.3, esp. at 110-15.
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For those who object to the fiduciary obligations placed on entre-
preneurs, this is grist to the mill. With a forked tongue, the law tells
their entrepreneur to maximise profit but to observe trustee-like stan-
dards fit for those 'who do not seek profit in the competitive market. It
is an inadequate answer for them to rely upon the semantic distinction
between "trustee" and "fiduciary," for "to say that a man is a fiduciary
only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry: to which is he
a fiduciary? What obligation does he owe as a fiduciary? '7 3
The fact is that we cannot conjure the type of obligation which our
law places on a director, still less the "strict application" which Laskin
J. (rightly) imposed, out of the facts of the market. They represent an
ethic imposed ab extra, partaking more of public law than of private
law, reaching back to the time when "trust" was a natural companion
of corporation. Indeed, is the tension which all the common law sys-
tems experience in deciding when and how to allow relaxation of the
fiduciary duty by way of shareholders' waiver or ratification not caused
less by the difficulties of doctrine (whether ratification is forbidden
when corporate "property" is involved, or when there is "fraud," or
when it is "unfair") than by the simple fact that we are permitting a
standard imposed on directors for public purposes to be released by the
mechanisms of private law? The strings of consent in the company's
general meeting are pulled by the shareholders, if not by the directors
themselves, to release them from an ethical standard. Fiduciary obliga-
tion is imposed by private law, but its function is public, and its pur-
pose social.
The Law Lords have recently become enamoured with "fiduciary
obligation" in the thick of public law. In order to stop the Greater
London Council from running a highly subsidised (and popular) trans-
port system, under statutory powers to promote provision of an "inte-
grated, efficient and economic" transport service, they disallowed it as
"arbitrary," with a major ground being that GLC is "an elected body,"
and as a local authority owed
a general fiduciary duty to the ratepayers from whom it obtains moneys needed
to carry out its statutory functions, and ... this includes a duty not to expend
those moneys thoughtlessly.7 4
73Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80 at 85-86
(1942), per Frankfurter J; see also on fiduciary remuneration, W. Bishop & D. Prentice, supra
note 60.
74 Bromley L.B.C. v. Greater London Council, [1983] 1 A.C. 768 at 829 (H.L.) However see
Swain v. Law Society, [1983] A.C. 598 (H.L.). Oddly enough, only a few months later, faced
with a statutory body, the Law Society, which had enjoyed a windfall under an insurance scheme
for the profession (of solicitors) the Law Lords rejected any idea that the Law Society could be in
a "fiduciary relationship" to the solicitors who contributed the premiums.
1985]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The point clearly emerges from a consideration of "insider deal-
ing." As The Times wrote editorially in 1984: "As all those closely
connected with the stock market know, insider trading goes on and on a
large scale."' 75 The provisions for crude criminal liability finally enacted
in 1980, under which less than a handful of proceedings have been
brought, established sanctions for insider dealing of such complexity
that they are more likely to be "a fertile source of examination ques-
tions for years to come" than any realistic prohibition."0 The conven-
tional wisdom on "insider dealing" is that "there ought to be a law
about it." But why? Many market economists claim that it may be
beneficial in an economic sense. 77 Professor Manne is not alone in pro-
testing that it can be a positive advantage, the sale of information pro-
moting entrepreneurial abilities to the good of American business, a
process in which no one really gets hurt. 8 One must then ask why most
comparable jurisdictions do have legislation to ban it.79
Professor Loss complains that the Manne school of market entre-
preneurs display "apparent scorn for the moral or public opinion factor
which is relegated to the "it's just not right propositions." For him a
market with insider dealing is like a game with marked cards.80 Other
justifications centre upon the need for an "informed market," which
requires confidence to release information, and argues that prohibition
of insider trading may enhance business decision making in larger cor-
porations. Yet in all this, the protagonists of prohibition seem to be
making heavy weather. The "marked cards" and "confidence" theory
would not stand up to a successful re-education of the investing public
75 The [London] Times (7 January 1984); see B. Rider, Insider Trading (1983).
76 Gower, supra note 8 at 636-38 (there is no civil remedy) on Companies Act, 1980, supra
note 71 Part V, now Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985 (U.K.), 1985 consolidated
seperately from the Companies Act 1985, supra, note 24 hopefully with a view to its speedy
improvement. See also D. Branson, "Insider Trading, British Regulation and American Experi-
ence" [1982] J.Bus.L. 342 at 413, 536.
77 H. Wu, "An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934"
(1968) 68 Columbia L. Rev. 260 at 266: "insider speculation will reduce price fluctuations and
will aid 'fair price determination'."
78 H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966); and see "Insider Trading and
the Law of Professors" (1970) 23 Vand. L. Rev. 547, replying to D. Ferber, "The Case Against
Insider Trading" ibid. 621; E. Herman, "Equity Funding, Insider Information and the Regula-
tors" (1973) 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1; R. Schotland, "Unsafe at any Price" (1967) 53 Va. L. Rev.
1425.
79 See Loss, supra, note 13 at 608, n.13; B. Rider & H. French, The Regulation of Insider
Trading (1979); on French reforms of 1983, see A. Tunc, "Reform of Insider Trading Law (1983)
4 Co. Law 205.
80 Loss, ibid. at 607-608; see also K. Scott, "Insider Trading" (1980) J. Leg. Stud. 801; E.
Haft, "The Effect of Insider Trading Rules" 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1051 (1982). See Loss's approach
comparatively in "The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate 'Insiders' in the
United States" (1970) 33 Mod. L. Rev. 34 at 35-37.
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by the Manne school which claims people come to understand - or to
believe - that the more trading there was inside, the richer all the
investors would be. The fact is that insider dealing is regarded as
"wrong." How could it be otherwise for directors and managers whose
fiduciary duties and rules of "exemplary behaviour" are broken if they
even make a "secret profit" on the side, however innocent, from the
execution of their office? We ban "insider dealing" because we make
the value judgement that, in the public interest, given the role of the
corporation in our society, that is a standard below which we will not
permit the controllers of such power to fall. It is a social power in trust
and must not be abused on an inside track. Enforcement is, alas, an-
other story, but we would not repeal the law of theft merely because it
was difficult to catch thieves and because Professor Manne told us
there should be no such law because without it the entrepreneurial sys-
tem would thrive.
II. FOR WHOM ARE CORPORATE MANAGERS
TRUSTEES?8'
This is essentially the same debate as that which swept through
the American law reviews in the 1930's - a debate which, curiously,
has never seen its equivalent in Britain. In that period professors Adolf
Berle and E. Merrick Dodd contested the issue: For whom are Corpo-
rate Managers Trustees?8 2 Berle argued that corporate powers were
held in trust for the shareholders, whereas Dodd was arguing that they
were held in trust for "the entire community" with a "social service as
well as a profit making function." To some extent their disagreement
was concerned with whether the enforcement of a wider social "trust"
was practicable. Although the question has continued to be put, there is
lessening confidence in the answer. Indeed, by 1966 we find writers
asking whether directors are "Trustees" at all?a3 This legal debate
sprang from two sources: the trauma of the crash, the recession and the
New Deal, and the analysis of the world of large corporations made in
"I See further K.W. Wedderburn, "The Legal Development of Corporate Responsibility" in
K. Hopdt & G. Teubner, eds., Corporate Governance and Directors Liabilities (1985) ch. 1.
82 A. Berle, "Corporate Powers in Trust" (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 and "For Whom
Corporate Managers are Trustees" (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365; E.M. Dodd, "For Whom are
Corporate Managers Trustees?" (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145; "Is Effective Enforcement of the
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Trustees Practicable?" (1934) 2 U. Chicago L. Rev. 194; J. Wei-
ner, "The Berle-Dodd Dialogue" (1964) 64 Columbia L. Rev. 1458.
81 H. Marsh, "Are Directors Trustees?" (1966) 22 Business Lawyer 35; C. Israels, "Are
Corporate Powers Still Held in Trust?" (1964) 64 Columbia L. Rev. 1446; "A New Look at
Corporate Directorship" (1968) 24 Bus. Law. 727.
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1932 by Berle and Means. 4 The very name of their work linked the
modern corporation with private property and therefore, since the con-
trollers are acting (at least theoretically) on behalf of others, with
trust. Maitland's connection remains. The "manageralist" thesis which
Berle and Means advanced, whereby the large corporation was hence-
forth to be run by "a neutral technocracy" which was "divorced" from
the shareholding "owners" has fared worse than their other conclu-
sions, in particular the insight that the modern corporation brings "a
concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms
with the modern state." Corporation law, they said, "becomes in sub-
stance a branch of the law of trust," but trust obligations which it is
hard for the absent stockholder to enforce. Herman's analysis' 5 has
shown convincingly that this "divorce" is far from absolute. The
description "greatly overstated the loss of stockholders' power and the
separation and discretion of managers," and many studies have punc-
tured the validity of the extremes to which managerialism was taken. 0
Herman found that the pressures in oligopoly "point toward a contin-
ued profit orientation," albeit "an internalisation of profitable growth
criteria in corporate psyches and in the rules of large managerial corpo-
rations." The corporation has become "an institutionalisation of the
capitalist function."87 Of course, such solutions do not solve all the
problems concerning the relationship of management executives in the
large corporation to the capitalist function. They fail to answer, for
example, in Marxist or similar analysis whether they are "delegated
capitalists, ' 's an incipient revolutionary class, 9 or already an indepen-
dent force, given remarkable qualities by Galbraith when he claimed
that, as a matter of fact, "the technostructure, as a matter of necessity,
bans personal profit-making."90 Such claims find a new base for the
fiduciary principle, but an extraordinary one in that the technocrats
will presumably be self-policing in their abstemious self-denial - an
idea hardly borne out by the realities of "golden parachutes" and daz-
8" A. Berle & G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 2d ed. (1967) at
241, 242, 312-13.
88 Herman, supra note 72 at 112, 258.
" See C. Beed, "The Separation of Ownership From Control" (1966) 1 J. Econ. Studies 29;
S. Aaronovitch & R. Smith, The Political Economy of British Capitalism (1981) at 239-50.
17 P. Baran & P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (1966) at 4; R. Miliband, The State in Capital-
ist Society (1967) at 25-36.
"8 G. Carchedi, Problems in Class Analysis (1983) at 183-88, criticising R. Miliband, Marx-
ism and Politics (1977); A. Cutlass et al., Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977).
88 J. Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (1941).
90 J.K. Gaibraith, The Industrial State (1967) at 117 (as against profit for shareholders).
One London corporate executive informed of this conclusion said, "you could have fooled me."
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zling executive life-style.
By 1955, Berle himself believed in not a dissimilar fashion, that
the modern corporation imposed trusts upon itself for the community
and that in this sense the argument had been "settled (at least for the
time being) squarely in favour of Professor Dodd's contention." Mod-
ern corporations had acquired a "conscience."'" Like others, he was
much impressed by the way that the law had withdrawn prohibitions,
such as ultra vires, to permit charitable and welfare donations of cor-
porate moneys - a process noticeable but less widespread in Britain. 2
These "altruistic" gifts are not, of course, "neutral" in political terms,
as British industry showed in 1956 when it gave 3 million pounds to re-
equip independent schools; just as all investment and other "internal
planning of such corporations becomes in effect social planning," often
primary social planning: "government fills the interstices left by these
prime decisions."9' 3 Berle and Means were correct in predicting that the
giant corporation would challenge the State. Corporations do spend on
avowedly "altruistic" and social purposes.
Although our laws will not normally allow a company's directors
to give all the assets away,94 they do permit gifts on a wide interpreta-
tion of what is "impliedly" for the benefit of the company. For "there
are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required to be for the
benefit of the company." 95 Why do we allow funds subscribed for profit
from (say) industrial purposes to be donated - in part - to disaster
91 A. Berle, The Twentieth-Century Capitalist Revolution (1955) at 137-51 and Power
Without Property (1959). Herman, supra note 72 at 259 contrasts the view of William Hazlitt
Table Talk (1952 ed.) at 264: "Corporate bodies are more corrupt and profligate than individuals,
because they have more power to do mischief, and are less amendable to disgrace or punishment.
They feel neither shame, remorse, gratitude, nor good-will."
92 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145 (1953); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Hender-
son, 257 A. 2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). In Britain: Evans v. Brunner, Mond and Co., Ltd., [1921] 1
Ch. 359 (implied power). British tax arrangements are less favourable to such gifts: on "company
giving" see Directory of Social Change, A Guide to Corporate Giving (1984). Charitable and
political gifts over 200 pounds a year must be disclosed: Companies Act 1985, supra note 24,
s.235 & Schedule 7.
93 H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974) at 268-69.
" Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919); Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [1962] 1 Ch.
927. The 'Jenkins" Committee (Cmnd. 1749, 1962) at para. 52 stated the "implied powers" of
companies too widely. See Simmonds v. Heffner, The (London) Times, (25 May 1983) for a
reminder that ultra vires is still a control on giving in England [payments by League Against
Cruel Sports to Labour Party in part ultra vires]; P. Davies, "Companies, in General" [1983] J.
Bus. L. 485; K.D. Ewing, "Company Political Donations and the Ultra Vires Rules" (1984) 47
Mod. L. Rev. 57.
9 Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co. (1883), 23 Ch. 654 at 673 (C.A.) per Bowen L.J.;
unless the gift is in pursuit of an express object: In re Horsley & Weight Ltd., [1982] Ch. 442;
Rolled Steel Ltd., supra note 28.
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funds, the relief of poverty, or even universities?9"
Corporate gifts smoke out the four different schools of thought
about "corporate social responsibility. '97 First, the "market" school
which is quite clear about social responsibility. If it means what it says,
they are against it for as Milton Friedman thundered, "The social re-
sponsibility of business is to increase its profits." To advocate social
responsibility for private business is "fundamentally subversive," if not
"preaching pure unadulterated socialism"; and businessmen "who talk
this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been
undermining the bases of a free society these past decades."98 Indeed,
if management of big enterprises is entitled, or worse obliged, to depart
from the role of "trustees for the shareholders," and consider "the pub-
lic or the social interest" or support "good causes," its power will be
seen to be "uncontrollable" and then it "could not be long left in the
hands of private managers but would inevitably be made the subject of
increasing public control."9 9
Furthest along the spectrum from this is the "corporate con-
science" school. After Berle's elaboration in the 1950's, the position
became remarkably fashionable in the United States, even though his
idea that the corporation was the "conscience-carrier of twentieth-cen-
tury American society" met with savage opposition (it would "be intol-
erable to free men"). 100 Others wished to cultivate corporate "con-
science" as a source of motivation and use it in "the best possible series
of compromises" along with competition and regulation. 101 But all in
this school held that the large enterprise had already become "the soul-
ful corporation. 0 2
" "Some companies believe that they should be giving nothing to charity; it is not their
business to give. Indeed, it is not the Directors' money to give, it is the shareholders' funds that
bear the cost": A Guide to Corporate Giving, supra note 92 at 152.
9 See further K.W. Wedderburn, "The Social Responsibility of Companies" [1985] Univ.
Melbourne L. Rev. 4.
98 M. Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits" in G.
Steiner & J. Steiner eds., Issues in Business and Society, 2d ed. (1977) at 168; Capitalism and
Freedom (1962) at 133; An Economist's Protest (1972) at 177. See also his earlier, and more
moderate, "Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law" (1957) 57 Columbia
L. Rev. 155.
99 F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol.3 (1979) at 82; Hayek, "The Corporation in a
Democratic Society" in M. Anshen & G. Bach, eds., Management and Corporation 1985 (1960)
at 99-117. See also E. Rostow, "To Whom and for What End Is Corporate Management Respon-
sible?" in E. Mason, ed., The Corporation in Modern Society (1960) 46. Profit maximization
should be re-established as the legal principle.
100 B. Lewis, "Economies by Admonition" (1959) 49 Am. Econ. Rev. 384 at 395.
101 W. Hamilton, The Politics of Industry (1957) at 138.
102 C. Kaysen, "The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation" (1957) 47 Am. Econ.
Rev. 311 at 314. On this school see Herman, supra note 72 at 258-60.
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The third school has been the most popular. This is the "fudge"
school. In one form or another, it argues that corporate "altruism" is
really engaged in what it believes to be "socially responsible conduct"
for what turn out to be "good business reasons." Sometimes expendi-
tures for public benefit as Manne explains, buys off "forces that create
real business costs in the form of unfavourable publicity." "Positive
utility," we are told, can be derived from a reputation for "corporate
statesmanship"; or produce "long-term benefit" for the stockholders
with "relatively cost-free ways of meeting social norms"; or make the
corporation less of a target for "ethical investors." Alternatively, others
discovered that "altruism," reasonably practised, is a condition for the
preservation of the modern capitalist system with diversified invest-
ment.10 3 Some of these writers begin by being more favourable to "cor-
porate altruism" while others note the internal structures of manage-
ment that may filter out decisions to act philanthropically. 0 4 Some
have even analysed the market and contextual social forces and discov-
ered a process of osmosis: the corporation, if only it will listen, will be
given by society "a clear signal when it should practice altruism" and
when it should put aside strict profit-maximisation; a solution that pro-
vides a place not only for commercial largesse but also for the adver-
tiser's commercial break.10 5 All these writers define the problem out of
existence by interpreting a (reasonable) dash of conscientious sauce to
be good for the dish of long-term profit maximisation.
The fourth, "radical" school is rather different. It regards the cor-
porate conscience as something which must be thrust upon, rather than
emerge from, the large corporation. Hence the following: the proxy
fight by the Project on Corporate Responsibility to put directors on the
board of GM; campaigns for "ethical" investment or the prevention of
corporate investment in South Afrcia or against employment discrimi-
nation; the stopping of Infant Formula milk being sold in the Third
World; and prohibiting the manufacture by Dow Chemical Ltd. of
napalm for use as a weapon.'06 Investor activism, and use of corporate
103 H.G. Manne, "The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism" (1973) 59 Va. L. Rev.
708 at 721-22; J.W. Mckie, ed., Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament (1974) at
14; H.G. Manne & H.C. Wallich, The Modern Corporation and Social Responsibility (1972) at
73; W.J. Baumol et al., A New Rationale for Corporate Social Policy (1970). See also M. Ashen,
ed., Managing the Socially Responsible Corporation (1974); R. Ackerman & P. Bauer, Corpo-
rate Social Responsiveness (1976).
104 R.P. Rumelt, Strategy, Structure and Economic Performance (1974) at 158-59.
03 D.L. Engel, "An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility" (1979) 32 Stanford L.
Rev. I at 49.
100 See the valuable account of these campaigns in Herman, supra note 72 at 256-77; on
Dow Chemical see also M.A. Chirelstein, "Corporate Law Reform" in Mckie, supra note 103 at
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machinery, is here a contingent tactic in wider campaigns, though
many of those engaged upon them also campaigned for reconstruction
of the legal structure of the corporation. Professor Getz recorded that
the "first echoes" of those developments were heard in Canada in the
1970's, and tells of a shareholders' meeting, where a group comprised
of "some bearded men, some slim and sexy girls and quite a few black
people" demonstrated against management's continued sale of alumin-
ium to a Portugese company for use in Mozambique, adding "it seems
likely this sort of demand will be increasingly loudly heard in
Canada."o 7
We have seen an equivalent debate in Britain but it took a rather
different route for reasons I will outline shortly. However, two things
are clear. First, everyone except "the most devout free market econo-
mists" believes that the corporation does encounter some "social re-
sponsibility" to incur costs for "socialy desirable, but not legally man-
dated, action."'1 8 Second, business, on its side, purports to act in that
way. Many of these transactions owe more to advertising than to altru-
ism. As Miliband has put it, this in after-dinner speeches is
where the giant enterprise becomes 'soulful', public-oriented, socially responsible
and all but literally obsessed with the welfare and well-being of YOU, the cus-
tomer. Here is where the corporation is most concerned with service, least with
profits, and only concerned with profit because it affords the corporation a better
chance to serve the customer and the community.109
Some businessmen are straightforward about their activities in
pursuit of social responsibility. Executives of Citibank and Levi Strauss
(UK) explained their spending on "community affairs" last year in
Britain as "seed corn," scattered because "the best place to do business
is a happy, healthy community," homing in on "social issues. . . to try
to take our activities away from pure P.R." Joan Robinson remarked
that business "high-mindedness is not all just a publicity stunt to rec-
ommend their class to the rest of us," and if the desire for "good repu-
tation and good conscience" hides behind hypocrisy, that is still "the
homage which vice pays to virtue . . . much to be preferred to cyni-
cism."" 0 Institutions have now been established to relate corporate-giv-
54-63; on "ethical" investors see Securities and Exchange Commission v, Medical Committee for
Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (D.C.C.A. 1972).
107 L. Getz, "The Structure of Shareholder Democracy" supra note 9, vol. 2 at 241.
108 Brudney, supra note 50 at 604-605. For the "economic context" see J. Mashaw, "The
Economic Context of Corporate Social Responsibility" in Teubner, supra note 81 at 55 and works
cited at 68.
109 R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (1969) at 215-16.
110 Financial Times (9 August 1984); 3. Robinson, Economic Philosophy (1962) at 145.
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ing to social issues, for example, "Business in the Community" and
"Action Resource Centre" in Britain which aim to switch funds from
"church bells to job creation," because industry operates "increasingly
by the consent of the community." No one will spurn the extra job that
such activity may create (for no one else is creating anything other
than part-time, shoe-shine employment) least of all any worker among
Britain's growing army of unemployed. Furthermore, the countryside is
better off with Shell's policy to "Protect the Countryside" than without
it.
It would be wrong to suggest that this activity is based upon any
credible theory of social responsibility, economic or legal, other than
statements which belong squarely within the territory of the "fudge"
school, like, "what is good for Exxon is good for Britain (and every
other country)." This is particularly important if we recall, as we
should, Braverman's conclusion that the "internal planning of such cor-
porations becomes in effect social planning." All corporate decisions to
buy church bells or to create jobs, noble though both may be, are dis-
positions of social power and raise the issue of social accountability; the
old question of "powers in trust for whom?" Business itself raises the
issue. When the Prime Minister of Canada says his government will
"make sure that corporations fulfil their social responsibility," a corpo-
ration (Inco), challenged by one of his Ministers about its intention to
make workers redundant, declared that it had been "particularly so-
cially responsible." '111
The best known effort to explain corporate responsibility in Britain
was made by the Confederation of British Industry [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the CBI] in 1973.112 Profit, it declared, is the "principal
yardstick" for private enterprise; but "profit alone" is not . . . the
whole of the matter." The company owes responsibilities to members,
creditors, customers, employees and to "society at large" (for the "en-
vironmental and social consequences of its business activities," for in-
stance). It must go beyond its strictly legal duties. How does one en-
capsulate a formula for guidance? The answer, which became
somewhat famous in the trade (for it was not a bad stroke on such a
difficult wicket) was: "A company should behave like a good citizen in
business." This standard was central to the various "codes" on business
ethics which have subsequently been adopted by one in four of the
large companies.113 However, it is not clear what effect it has had upon
1 The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (13 September 1985).
112 C.B.I., The Responsibilities of the British Public Company (1973).
International Management, Survey on Ethics and Business (1983).
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British executives to be sent out into the market place with the injunc-
tion, "Be a good citizen in business." Perhaps more important is the
CBI's recognition of the varied constituencies which a board must keep
in mind; not just shareholders and creditors, but (on "an informed and
ethical judgement") employees, customers, and citizens at large. In-
deed, many businessmen assert that the economic or legal doctrine that
they owe duties primarily to shareholders, is at odds with the fact that
they regard themselves as acting and do act with a wider remit. In
1960, the editor of the Investor's Chronicle declared that the interests
of shareholders, employees and customers were "co-equal interests to
be served by companies." 114 The Institute of Directors tells members
they are "representatives of the shareholders' interest"; but they owe
duties also to "employees, customers and creditors." 115 The City Code
on Take-Overs and Mergers tells directors today to take into considera-
tion: "the shareholders' interests taken as a whole, together with those
of employees and creditors."11 As Herman quotes the chairman of Ex-
xon (Standard Oil) in 1946 on the task of the modern manager: achiev-
ing "an equitable and working balance among the claims of the various
directly interested groups - stockholders, employees, customers, and
the public at large. ' 1 7 Even legally, there is a sense in which this
formula can be more comfortable for management. If its obligation is
to pay direct regard to interests only of shareholders and profit, there
may be occasions (as the English cases show) when it will slip up, con-
sider other interests improperly and be exposed to a legal action by a
shareholder. But if the legal obligation is to balance, as best it can in
its judgment, the competing interests of diverse constituencies, then
only the board of directors that is both careless and crooked is likely to
be caught out. It needs to put in evidence only an honest business judg-
ment, taking one thing with another. On the other hand, when interests
are legally recognised, machinery must surely be invented for enforce-
ment. The exclusive right to challenge misfeasance can no longer rest
in the shareholder if others too are ultimate beneficiaries of manage-
ment's fiduciary duties.
Hypocrisy or not, these repeated statements by business leaders
have compelled attention when governance of the corporation is on the
agenda. They have challenged, at least in their formulation, the re-
114 W. Wincott, Evidence to Jenkins Company Law Committee Day 1, (23 September, 1960)
at 49 (emphasis added).
"' Institute of Directors, Guidelines for Directors (1973) at 13.
118 Council for the Securities Industry, City Code on Take-overs and Mergers (1984), Gen-
eral Principle 9.
117 Herman, supra note 72 at 254.
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peated strictures of Hayek and his accolytes:
Unless we believe that the corporations serve the public interest by devoting their
resources to the single aim of securing the largest return in terms of long-run
profits, the case for free enterprise breaks down." 8
Hayek is a logical capitalist, regarded as "absolutely supreme" by the
current British Prime Minister. Yet some of his logic belongs to an era
now long past as can be seen when, in the same essay, he insists that no
limited liability company should be permitted to own voting shares in
another business company because that would break the chain of eco-
nomic, market motivation. But companies break his precepts - or say
they do - by giving money to "social purposes," even to education and
research ("clearly not desirable . . . as legitimate purposes of corpora-
tion expenditure"). From a rather different stable, Crosland wrote in
1956 that the legal issues about "major, structural reform" of compa-
nies, aimed at enforcing duties to the community or to workers by a
more accountable management and reducing shareholders' powers,
were of little relevance because in the face of managerial power such a
"change in the law, logical though it might be, would make no differ-
ence to the underlying reality."11 9 It is just this apparent unavailability
to legal process of the powers held by controllers of the modern corpo-
ration - management along with dominant financial interests - that
has maintained the interest in the quest for new lines of accountability.
Even at a conventional legal level, the issue is not excluded. The
recent draft programme for reform of corporation law by the American
Law Institute [hereinafter referred to as ALI] was modest.120 It did not
advocate, as some do, compulsory Federal charters, but rather, advo-
cated a majority of "independent" directors (a reform which Brudney
has shown to have limited value)1 21 and an "audit committee." The
accent here is to increase the independence of the board of directors,
not so much from shareholders as from the top management executives
of the large corporation. This is an aim not dissimiliar to that of the
European company laws which have adopted a "two-tier" board struc-
11 Hayek, "The Corporation in a Democratic Society," supra note 99 at 99-117. On Mrs.
M. Thatcher's comments see Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.), col. 756 (10 March 1948); on university
guidelines for foundations and corporation giving see R.H. Mundheim, "A Comment on the Social
Responsibilities of Life Insurance Companies as Investors" (1975) 61 Va. L. Rev. 1247 at 1261-
64.
119 C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (1956) at 351, 362.
120 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement
and Recommendations Draft No.1 (1982).
11 See Brudney, supra, note 50; on social accounting see D.M. Branson, "Progress in the Art
of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility"
(1976) 29 Vand. L. Rev. 539.
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ture, as in Germany and the Netherlands, where a "Supervisory Coun-
cil" supervises the "Management Board." The proposals, to British
eyes, seem to relax parts of the fiduciary principle, not least by insis-
tence upon standards of due care and "business judgment," by permit-
ting the board in the American fashion to prevent derivative suits at
least where this is not unreasonable.122 But the scheme is firmly
founded on profit-maximisation. The role that corporation law reform
is seen to play is limited in substantive terms, relying upon reforms of
organisational structure and the basic elements of fiduciary duty. The
ALI stated: "Corporate law should provide that the objective of the
business corporation is to conduct business activities with a view to cor-
porate profit and shareholder gain, except that [it may] properly take
into account ethical principles that are generally recognised as rele-
vant," and may also "devote resources, within reasonable limits to pub-
lic welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes. '"128
This document, like the CBI Report in Britain, is one of the more suc-
cessful products of the "fudge" school. We do not know when and how
profit is to be forbidden if a transaction is alleged to be unethical, nor
what kind of poll is to determine the ambit of relevant and
"recognised" standards. As Branson says, in attempting to make corpo-
rations "accountable" with "flexibility," it
never articulates whether accountability is to shareholders, the society or clean
air and water, and why this accountability is necessary . . . the drafters never
bring to the fore reasons why law must limit managers' power.12'
III. WORKERS AND THE RECONSTRUCTED
CORPORATION
The debate about corporate social responsibility still raises the
question for company law whether the corporation should not be recon-
structed. Except for the "devout" adherents to the market school, the
framework of shareholder-democracy, on which company law is built,
no longer seems entirely adequate. Should not the corporate "trustee-
ship" be redefined? It is here that the debates, largely in the last dec-
ade, on the two sides of the Atlantic diverge in their character, for
reasons that reach deep into the cultural roots of the societies involved;
reasons which certainly include the profound differences not only in
122 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. S.C. 1981).
12 Principles, supra note 120 at para. 2.01; see M.J. Pritchett, "Corporate Ethics and Cor-
porate Governance" (1983) 71 Calif. L. Rev. 994.
124 D.M. Branson, "Countertrends in Corporate Law" (1983) 68 Minn. L. Rev. 53 (a useful
review).
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capital markets but also in the labour movements, both between Britain
and most Western European countries and, even more, between the
trade union movements of Europe and the labour unions of the United
States.
The American debate in the 1950's included rough-hewn schemes
for "membership" of the corporation to be extended to employees, sup-
pliers, customers and even dealers - extensions of what Eisenberg
terms "client group participation. '125 Many exponents lost heart for
they could find no magic formula for reconciling conflicting interests.
To reconstruct boards so as to encourage "responsibility" but then limit
management's freedom of action seemed "to aim in both directions at
once."' 26 Others envisaged multiple legal actions by customers or em-
ployees against management, even "citizens' suits. ' 127 Notwithstanding
the opposition these schemes have not died out. Indeed they prolifer-
ated in the so-called "confessional period" of the 1970's with its disclo-
sures of corporate political payoffs, "slush-funds," external bribery, and
"questionable payments." There were calls for more "outside" directors
on boards, for "audit committees" and "public policy" committees to
supplement SEC action. 128 The increase in "independent" directors
seemed to change little (except that some academic directors increased
their income by 80 per cent). However, the belief was still being ex-
pressed in 1980 that reform of the "corporation's internal governance
structure [is] the most likely vehicle for accomplishing changes in cor-
porate behaviour."' 29 Stone proposed that every large corporation
should have a minority of directors appointed by a Federal agency, and
later more modestly suggested the addition of "special public directors"
that could be appointed by a court . 30 But experiments with govern-
ment appointees to the boards of American enterprises have not been
happy,' 3' and as Crosland pointed out long ago, the trouble with "gov-
ernment nominees on a private board" is that they "must either 'go
115 A. Chayes, "The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law" in Mason, supra note 99, 25
at 40-45; M.A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation (1976) at 19.
20 Chirelstein, supra note 106 at 56.
'2 A. Conard, Corporations in Perspective (1976) at 405-406.
128 Brudney, supra note 50 at 636, 647; J.C. Coffee, "Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry" (1977)
63 Va. L. Rev. 1099; Herman, supra note 72 at 280-84.
129 D.A. Demott, ed., Corporations at the Crossroads (1980) at 8. See also ch.2: B. Man-
ning, "Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform"; ch.3: E.J. Weiss & D.E. Schwartz,
"Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors"; ch.4: A.A. Somer, "The Impact of the
SEC On Corporate Governance".
120 C.D. Stone, Where the Law Ends (1975) and "The Place of Enterprise Liability in Con-
trol of Corporate Conduct" (1980) 90 Yale L.J. 1.
21 Herman, supra note 72 at 289-92; A. Conard, "Reflections on Public Interest Directors"
(1977) 75 Mich. L. Rev. 941.
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native' or remain suspect."1 2 The most extensive plan for wholesale
reform was presented by Nader and his associates. Large corporations
would need a federal charter imposing many conditions, thereby repair-
ing a defect in the Constitution. The board would represent nine con-
stituencies, with representatives of shareholders, management, employ-
ees, marketing, law-enforcement, finance, planning, consumers, and the
community.133
It would be wrong to say that there have been no equivalent pro-
posals in Britain. Reforms for company law have concentrated upon
non-executive "independent" directors, "community" shares; division of
governmental powers among many constituencies in a manner even
more bewildering than Nader's, reduction of the equity shareholder to
a fixed interest creditor, and control through efficiency or "social" au-
dits.13 4 Nor have all such proposals come from socialist or radical sta-
bles. An enlightened businessman in 1961 proposed shareholding con-
stituencies for an employees' council, consumer advisory service, public
authority and shareholders, whilst ten years before the owner of a
chemical enterprise gave 90 per cent of his shares to found the first of a
number of workers' co-operatives - the "Scott Bader Common-
wealth. 1 3 5 The same is true in Europe. The proposals of Bloch-Laine
in 1963, again for new interest group constituencies but (being French)
with a prominent role for State participation, came from Catholic so-
cial doctrine.13 6 But his overriding imperative was "the necessity to give
a new place to workers and their representatives. 1 37 A similar philoso-
phy of "co-partnership" inspired writers who adhered to the Liberal
Party in Britain.138 There are many other currents to what has been a
132 Crosland, supra note 119 at 358.
133 R. Nader, M. Green & J. Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (1976); "The Corpo-
rate Impact" in Steiner &Steiner, supra note 100.
134 Respectively, Pro-Ned, The Role of the Non-Executive Director (1982); J. Boswell, Can
Labour Master the Private Sector? (1968); N. Ross, The Democratic Firm (1964); P. Derrick,
The Company and the Community (1964).
13 G. Goyder, The Responsible Company (1961); F.J. Blum, Work and Community (1968).
See also on the John Lewis "partnership" A. Flanders, R. Pomeranz & J. Woodward, Experiment
in Industrial Democracy (1968), and on the "Co-operatives" and "Yugoslav" pattern P. Brannen,
Authority and Participation in Industry (1983) at 135-45.
136 F. Bloch-Laine, Pour une Riforme de l'entreprise (1963); on the later French debates see
P. Sudreau, La Reforme de l'entreprise (1975).
137 N. Catala, L'Enireprise (1980) at 161, and see paras. 149-62 on the French debates.
Today, unions and employers agree only on autonomous collective bargaining (at 176). But on the
labour law reforms and the new duty to bargain of 1982, see G. Camerlynck, G. Lyon-Caen & J.
Pelissier, Droit du travail, 2d ed. (1984) at paras. 800-93; Y. Delamotte, "Recent Trends in
Regulation of Industrial Relations in France" (1985) 10 Labour & Society 7.
I" M.P. Fogarty, Company and Corporation - One Law? (1965); Wider Business Objec-
tives: American Thinking and Experience (1966); and Company Responsibility and Participation
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broad river of pressure for "workers' participation." The experiments in
"job enrichment" and "job satisfaction" within the plant, especially in
Scandinavia, have undoubtedly changed the conditions and human re-
lationships at many workplaces.139 Yet, the crucial demands for worker
participation have, in all countries, gone far beyond shopfloor reor-
ganisation of work.
Two features have characterised the predominant part of the Eu-
ropean debate. First, proposals for multi-constituency control of the
corporation became a small eddy in the mainstream which has been
concerned with two groups only: shareholders and management, on one
side, and the workers on the other (though sometimes as in the German
law of 1976, executive management is classified with the workers). Eu-
ropean debate has been concerned with the issue whether we can, by
law, create a new, bipartite control, out of which to achieve a redefini-
tion of corporate powers held in trust. Beyond that there appeared to
lie only the alternative of nationalisation and nationally public owner-
ship. This acceptance of the company's employees as the new character
in the drama marked our company law debates. Encouraged by manag-
ers who insisted that they did pay direct attention to workers' interests,
Parliament introduced into British company law in 1980 the obligation
for directors to pay regard to the interests of employees generally as
well as those of shareholders, though it hastened to add that the duty
could be enforced only by the company.40 There was no intention to
encourage shop stewards to come to work clutching a derivative writ in
one hand and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle in the other. In fact, the
section has made little difference and can legitimately be written off as
"window dressing."141
The second reason why the 1980 Companies Act reforms were felt
to be of little importance lay in the recognition that they were only a
tiny part of the wider debate which was not about "workers' participa-
tion," but was really about "industrial democracy." In one country af-
ter another following the war, in some by new philosophies, in others by
retracing the steps of old programmes, the legitimacy of the eco-
(1975).
"' J. Elliott, Conflict or Co-operation (1978) at 197-202; R. Lansbury, Improving the Qual-
ity of Working Life (1978).
140 Companies Act 1980 (U.K.), 1980, c.22, s.46(l),(2) now Companies Act 1985, supra
note 24, s.309(l), (2).
141 J. Birds, "Making Directors Do Their Duties" (1980) 1 Co. Law. 67 at 73; see also Pren-
tice, supra note 71 at 139 (directors should publish their reasons for decisions affecting employ-
ees); and "A Company and Its Employees" (1980) 10 Indus. L.J. 1.
142 See on the revival in British unions of older traditions and "syndicalist" thinking that
"went underground" after 1932: Wedderburn, supra, note 81 at 32-34; S. Sciarra, ed.,
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nomic and social order was put in issue. "La question de la lbgitimit
du pouvoir &conomique est posge dans vos entreprises."1 3
IV. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND POWERS IN TRUST?
Observers of these phenomena on this side of the Atlantic have
been legitimately puzzled. How could it be that countries, especially
Britain, which were thought to share a belief in the virtues of autono-
mous collective bargaining, a system that is predicted upon the conflict-
ing interests of workers and employers, should now be considering
structures in which the employer lion lies down with the union lamb in
unitary peace? This caused particular concern when it came to be real-
ised that the Draft "Fifth Directive" of the EEC was meant to infil-
trate such notions of "employee representation" within the enterprise
into the company law of each member State of the EEC. (The draft is
now thirteen years old, quite unrecognisable from its first draft, permit-
ting an "option" of workers' participation through collective bargain-
ing, and unlikely to be enacted for many decades).4 It was asked, for
example, how workers' representatives who participated in the board of
directors, or the like, could possibly avoid dual loyalties, wearing two
hats at once.145 The same questions, it must be said, were posed force-
fully by many European trade unions. Herman excluded consideration
of labour unions from his study saying that: "In the United States la-
bour has rarely sought board representation . . . Organised labor has
been oriented to bread and butter gains via bargaining. 1 46
Some Europeans have replied to this wonderment by pointing out
that now even in the United States, representatives of unions can be
found on a corporation board or two, but this is no answer. When a
union representative went on the board at Chrysler, it was reported
that he would "advance the interests of the broad Chrysler Community
- shareholders, workers, suppliers, dealers, consumers, and the pub-
lic."1 47 So, too, where Eastern Air Lines in 1983 offered two seats on
Democrazia Politica e Democrazia Industriale (1978).
I'l M. Rocard, "Les socialistes face aux patrons" [Nov. 1976] L'Expansion at 193.
144 Commission of E.C. "Proposed Directive on the Harmonisation of Company Law and
Company Structure" (1975) 8 Bull. E.C. Supp. 8/75; and now (1983) 117 European Industrial
Rev. and Report 8. See, too, on the "Vredeling" draft Directive (1983) 115 E.I.R.R. 7.
145 B. Hamer, "Serving Two Masters" (1981) 81 Colum. L. Rev. 639; B. Forst, "Labor
Union Representation on Boards of Corporate Competitors" (1982) 7 J. Corp. L. 421; B.
Abramowitz, "Broadening the Board: Labour Participation in Corporate Governance" (1980) 34
S.W.L.J. 963.
246 Herman, supra note 72 at 288.
147 D. Fraser, 21 March (1980), quoted in Brudney, supra note 50 at 605, 139; but the Wall
Street Journal (29 October 1979) reported him to say he would "speak for the auto workers and
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the board and a 25 per cent equity holding to the union as part of a
settlement with 20 per cent wage cuts, a rescue package for the enter-
prise.1 48 These were not strides to a brave new corporate world. They
were responses to cries for help in the recession, and, no doubt, in the
particular industrial situations, were very sensible steps to take. The
European movement towards "industrial democracy" had very different
- perhaps unrealistic - perspectives, not (it is worth stressing again)
necessarily a "socialist" perspective but one at which many different
types of ideology arrived and with different emphases and accents. In
1975 the European Commission discussion document which was the be-
ginning of renewed attempts to make the draft "Fifth Directive" more
flexible said:
The current period of profound economic and social change in the world ...
emphasizes the necessity for action. . . .The scope for real increases in incomes
has diminished or disappeared and unemployment continues to grow. As a result
industrial relations have been placed under stress . . . the current economic situ-
ation, with its reduced possibilities for growth, has emphasized the need for
mechanisms which will adequately ensure the pursuit of goals other than eco-
nomic growth such as the improvement of the quality of life and working condi-
tions. . . .The pursuit of such goals can probably be secured only by the exis-
tence of decision making processes in enterprises which have a broader,
democratic base than such processes often have at present.
149
These were proposals which manifestly aimed to save, rather than to
replace, the various capitalist economic systems of the member States.
They also recognised the difficulties with which opponents of such re-
form made great play, not least the argument that "worker directors"
(an unfortunate phrase, and one that is unfair to those directors who
work hard) would inevitably be beset by dual or conflicting loyalties. I
have always been struck by the way in which commentators reach for
this particular weapon as soon as employee participation on the board
of the company or elsewhere within the enterprise, comes within their
sights. Usually writers would be shocked by the reflection that they
appeared to express a radically Marxist view as to the irreconcilable
conflict of interest which must (on this view) exist irredeemably be-
tween capital and labour. I happen to think that the conflict between
employers which buy, and workers who sell labour power is fundamen-
tal to our societies. But many an incumbent of a place on a company
board is already in a position of contrasting, if not conflicting, loyalties.
Even on the "profit-maximisation" view of company law, directors
the public."
148 Financial Times (13 December 1983).
119 "Employee Participation and Company Structure" (1975) 8 Bull. E.C. Supp. 8/75 at 11.
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must, in law, balance the interests of equity shareholders who want
maximum dividend, with those of preference shareholders who want se-
cure, fixed dividend, and frequently of many other types of shareholder.
Admit the creditors to the directors' permitted considerations and the
conflicts become even greater. We allow nominee directors on our com-
pany boards, put there by a powerful interest, possibly not even a
shareholding interest. "There is nothing wrong in it," said Lord Den-
ning in 1963:
it is done every day. Nothing wrong, that is, so long as the director is left free to
exercise his best judgement in the interests of the company which he serves. But
if he is put on on terms that he is bound to act in the affairs of the company in
accordance with the directions of his patron, it is beyond doubt unlawful.'"
Such rationalisations do not command total confidence in reality, how-
ever fine they may look in the books.
This is in fact a point where the trustee ethic seems to set too high
a standard for the director in the eye of many common law courts. The
Australian courts have long considered that a director put on the board
to protect the interests of a secured creditor is entitled to give priority
to those interests.5 This can be done in terms of legal doctrine only by
giving to the interests of the company an artifical and reified character
which allows the judge to do with it what he wishes. The problem is not
made any easier if, as in a New Zealand case, two opposed patrons
have the right to nominate directors.15 2 The truth is that, even in ortho-
dox company law, there is no simple answer to the dual loyalty prob-
lem. The standard is set by the value judgements imposed by the ethic
prevailing among those who determine standards of the law. Of course
it is true that representatives of labour on a company board are inevita-
bly subjected to conflicting considerations or, if you like, "conflicting
loyalties." Yet to suggest that leaders of trade unions are not now sub-
jected to conflicting considerations, whether to push the demands of the
members beyond a certain point or whether to act as the machinery for
explaining the company's point of view to the members, is to mistake
the realities of the workplace. Wearing two hats is a normal part of a
150 Boulting v. Association of Cinematographic, Television and Allied Technicians, [1963] 2
Q.B. 606 at 626-27; Selanger United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock (No.3), [1968] W.L.R.
1555 (Ch. Div.) See the middle position taken by Gower, supra note 8 at 580.
151 Levin v. Clarke, [1962] N.S.W.R. 686 (S.C.); A. Afterman, Company Directors and
Controllers (1970) at 55-60; H.A.J. Ford, Principles of Company Law, 3d ed. (1982) at 375. On
the "interests of the company" in English law, see "Ultra Vires in Modern Company Law" supra
note 45 at 209-10; Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd., [1982] 3 All E.R. 1016 (Ch. Div.).
112 Berlei Hestia, supra, note 48. Jacobs J. did not follow Lord Denning in Scottish Co-
operative Wholesale Society v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.); and see Wotherspoon v. Cana-
dian Pacific Ltd. (1979), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 545 at 697-714 (Ont. H.C.).
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trade union official's life, not least in the administration of collective
agreements; that part of collective bargaining which makes it some-
thing more than a persistent haggle and makes "joint regulation a
much more appropriate term to indicate its essential character. ' 153 The
argument that a union representative on a company board will inevita-
bly be captive is one thing. That is a practical judgment, adopted both
by radicals and by traditionalists in trade unions. But the argument
that the law cannot cope with those who are subject to trust-like duties
if they are subjected to conflicting pressures is not true on the prece-
dents. That is exactly what the English High Court dealt with recently
in relation to trustees nominated for a pension fund, half by the em-
ployer and half by the union: all had to exercise the powers of invest-
ment "so as to yield the best return for the beneficiaries."""
The importance of pension funds in all of our societies makes a
related point. Workers in Western economies have new interests -
new ties, some would say - in economic wealth, but the institutions in
which these are expressed take a variety of forms and few of them give
to workers as such influence of more than a passing character over the
fundamental decisions that affect their lives.
This remains true even if the structure and administration of those
institutions are subjected to collective bargaining with their trade un-
ions. Certainly the institutions that have developed in Western Europe
to promote that influence since the War are remarkable by their vari-
ety. Both at enterprise and at plant level one finds laws setting up the
German Works Council composed wholly of workers; the French
comit& d'entreprise chaired by management; the Italian formal com-
missioni interni elbowed aside by the informal, union consiglii di fab-
brica which bear striking resemblances to British shop stewards' com-
mittees (especially combine committees with stewards of many unions).
Some of these bodies have powers by law, especially powers of
consultation - and such rules of labour law are as much part of a
reform of company law as sections in the Companies Acts - but few
have powers that reach as far as the levels where strategic decision-
making takes place. In the 1970's there was for that reason "a broad
consensus in many countries that works councils have not lived up to
the expectations that were placed in them when they were first initi-
15 A. Flanders, Management and Unions (1970) at 222.
154 Cowan, supra note 61; see R. Nobles's "Conflict of Interest in Trustees Management of
Pension Funds," supra note 61 and see T. Schuller & J. Hyman, "Trust Law and Trustees"
(1983) 12 Ind. L.J. 84.
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ated."'15 5 Not everyone agreed with that, certainly not everyone in Brit-
ain in regard to shop stewards. Even so, the view was widespread that
if workers' influence was to be felt in the taking of critical decisions
about the enterprise, new institutions should at least be considered.
It was this that led to the close debate about experiments with
worker participation at the board level in the company. It seemed quite
absurd to say that directors in the modern company were subjected to
fiduciary duties which involved shareholders and employees equally and
then to omit the employees altogether from the constitution of the in-
corporated enterprise. Such an offer to the workers would be little bet-
ter than a fraudulent prospectus. At this level of the board there were,
again, many varieties of experiment. Two systems attracted most atten-
tion a decade ago, the German and the Swedish. By the mid-1970's
both were well established experiments, and it may be of some impor-
tance to those societies that the experiments began when they did. In
1951, largely on the proposal of British advisers, German trade unions
were drawn into co-determination in companies at both of two levels. 150
First, the Works Council was established by law (as it had been in the
Weimar Republic), 157 composed of elected workers (who are usually,
but need not be, union members), with certain consultative powers, but
placed under a legal obligation to work with the employer in a spirit of
mutual trust. Second, at the board level, on the top layer of the two-tier
board structure of the large German company (the Supervisory Coun-
cil) sit workers' and union representatives: 50 per cent in the coal and
steel ("Montan") industries; and in other large companies, at first as
one-third of the members, but now since 1976 nearly 50 per cent.
Around these legal structures flows collective bargaining. Although
commentators have questioned the extent to which the legal structures
really allow workers to influence any strategic decisions by the Man-
agement Board, 5 8 and although the German model is usually offered
as an example of "unitary" labour relations 9 (which makes it both
1,5 J. Schregle, "Workers' Participation In Decisions Within Undertakings" (1976) 113
Intn'l Labour Rev. I at 8.
256 H.J. Spiro, The Politics of German Codetermination (1958); see also D.F. Vagts, "Re-
forming the 'Modern' Corporation" (1966) 80 Harm. L. Rev. 23.
157 0. Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic, ed. by R. Lewis & J.
Clark, trans. by J. Clark (1981) at 214-21; and now Works Constitution Act, 1972.
18 See P.L. Davies, "Employee Representation on Company Boards and Participation in
Corporate Planning" (1975) 38 Mod. L. Rev. 254; S. Simitis, "Workers' Participation in the
Enterprise" (1975) 38 Mod. L. Rev. 1.
1,9 J. Schregle, "Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany" (1978) 117 Intn'l
Labour Rev. 81; but contrast C.W. Summers, "Workers' Participation in the United States and
the Federal Republic" (1979) 32 Recht der Arbeit 257 and "Co-determination in the United
States" (1982) 4 J. Comp. Corp. L. & See. Reg. 155.
[VOL. 23 No. 2
Trust, Corporation and the Worker
unreal and inappropriate for export), neither trade unionists, managers
nor scholars in Germany are satisfied with that analysis. In particular,
the dual loyalty problem is answered by stressing the fact that these
structures are concerned not with substantive rules about "participa-
tion" but with the provision of additional procedures through which
conflict may be, at least transitionally, resolved. 6 We shall see that
this thinking had a parallel in Britain.
That approach brings us closer to the second experiment, in Swe-
den. This is based much more firmly upon collective bargaining, in a
society where some 90 per cent of industry, let us remember, is pri-
vately owned, with an increasing slice being held by interests outside of
Sweden. It has had three prongs."6' First, since 1973 each of the two
trade union confederations has had one representative on the (one-tier)
boards of companies of any size. This minority representation is aimed
not at power, but at information. The directors appointed through trade
union machinery report back to the Works Councils in their enter-
prises, which are established not by law but on an autonomous basis by
the unions. A study of this structure in operation reveals that there has
been little difficulty about confidential information acquired by work-
ers' representatives, another problem which is often advanced by those
troubled by dual loyalty difficulties. Indeed, it is well known in Britain
that union officials and shop stewards acquire confidential information
(about new models of products in development, for example), but there
is no known case of such trade secrets being revealed, let alone of any
insider dealing by unions on the stock market. Second, the traditional
obligation to bargain has been supplemented by the bold Joint Regula-
tion at Work Act 1976, which gives to workers' unions the right to
negotiate "joint regulation" agreements on any matter within the ambit
of corporate affairs. The final prong is the Meidner Plan, which is now
modified into the project for Wage Earner Funds whereby part of the
company profits is diverted into collective funds for workers and is in-
tended to affect corporate ownership by holding shares. This last item
160 See the valuable discussion by F. Kubler, "Dual Loyalty of Labor Representation" in
Hopt & Teubner, supra note 81 at 429-42.
161 See F. Schmidt, Law and Industrial Relations in Sweden (1977); A. Victorin, "Co-deter-
mination in Sweden" (1979) 2 J. Comp. Corp. L. & Sec. Reg. 111 and "A New Era for Collective
Labour Law in Sweden" (1978) 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 609; C. Summers, "Comparisons in Labour
Law: Sweden and the United States" (1985) 7 Indus. ReL L.J. 1. See, too, Reports to the 10th
World Congress of the International Society of Labour Law and Social Security: L. Merrifield,
"Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings" (1982) 5 Comp. Labour L. 1; R. Ri-
chardi, "Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many" ibid. 23; 0. Bergqvist, "Worker Participation and Decisions Within Undertakings in Swe-
den" ibid. 64.
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is currently a matter of sharp political division in Sweden. However, it
was the second prong which caused the greatest interest in Britain in
the 1970's because it seemed to address the central issue which a ma-
jority of British trade unions had identified as the modern crisis of col-
lective bargaining. 1 2
That crisis related to the levels which collective bargaining can
reach. Whereas British unions had for decades exerted influence, at
least in times of so-called "full employment," upon the wages and other
conditions of employment of workers, they had been relatively unable
to influence the strategic economic decisions upon which the very fu-
ture of employment might depend, in particular decisions about clo-
sures and about investment. These were the internal, corporate deci-
sions which determined social priorities. In 1974, in an extraordinary
reversal of traditional policy the majority of the unions in the Trades
Union Congress adopted a programme in which they demanded work-
ers' representation to the extent of 50 per cent on the directing boards
of all large companies and public corporations. Union leaders were in-
sistent that this did not imply adoption of a unitary stance in relations
with employer but rather, they saw this step as an extension of collec-
tive bargaining or joint regulation: The extension of joint regulation in
any form, including collective bargaining, is a de facto sharing of the
management prerogative. 163 It must be added that a minority of unions
(some on the right, some on the left) rejected this demand. The
EETPU said the union role is one of opposition to management deci-
sion. "Far better . . . that the responsibility for that decision is firmly
laid at the management's door; then the collective bargaining machin-
ery can oppose and moderate the impact of the decision when neces-
sary." But that was exactly what worried the majority, not least be-
cause the power to moderate was not always evident. In modern
economic conditions, that philosophy legitimises the right of manage-
ment to make the critical decisions, leaving the union to negotiate such
crumbs as it can after the investment decisions have been taken.
The Labour Government set on foot limited experiments in public
corporations (all long since buried).164 It also set up a committee under
162 This account does not imply that developments in other countries, not least the Nether-
lands, Denmark, and Norway, were not influential. See generally: P. Montalenti, ed., Operel ed
Europa La Partecipazione del Lavatori alla Gestione dell'lmpresa (1981); Symposium, "Worker
Participation in Management" (1980) 4 Comp. L. Yearbook 1; E. Batstone & P. Davies Indus-
trial Democracy: European Experience (1976); Commission on Industrial Relations, Worker Par-
ticipation and Collective Bargaining in Europe; R. Lansbury, "Industrial Democracy through
Participation in Management: the Australian Experience" [1978] Ind. Rel. J. 71.
163 Trade Union Congress, Industrial Democracy (1974; new ed. 1977) at 35, para. 88.
I" See [on steel] P. Brannen et al., The Worker Directors (1976), and [on the Post Office]
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Lord Bullock to recommend ways in which, in practical terms and by
adjusting company law, workers' representatives might best participate
in decisions of companies through representation on boards of directors.
In the Bullock Report, a majority of the committee (which included the
present writer) recommended a scheme for equal numbers of share-
holder and employee representatives to be joined on the boards of all
companies of any size (and all companies within big groups) by a third,
smaller slice or independent members, added normally by co-option.6 5
The Committee made many mistakes, not least of which was in expres-
sing this formula in algebraic terms as "2X + Y," but that was not the
only reason for the thunderous disapproval of management which can
still be heard today. In fact, a complex battle followed the Report. The
headlines in The Investor's Chronicle read "Fight Bullock at the Barri-
cades. ' '166 The Government retreated behind a watered down version of
the scheme;6 7 and in 1979 it lost power in the General Election. Emi-
nent commentators on the Report declared that it tried to mix oil and
water. One could build industrial democracy either "in the land of col-
lective bargaining on the pluralistic pattern" or "in the land of com-
pany law on the unitary pattern," not both. Although the reply was
made that these "old maps of 'unitary' and 'pluralist' models" might be
inadequate to modern needs,"6 8 the debate did not go well for the Re-
port. It was argued that, in Britain as in Germany, unions misdirect
their aim in looking to the board, for that is not where the real deci-
sions are taken, a point to which Swedish experience suggested the re-
ply that only by opening the doors of the board room can access be
gained to those other levels of decision-making, or even to the informa-
tion about the corporate decision-making processes. Whether or not
any such scheme could have been introduced in Britain, we cannot now
tell. What is clear is that the strategic decisions on investment and clo-
sures have remained within the area of managerial prerogative, touched
very little by the fingers of collective bargaining, even in Sweden and
Italy (where claims were made for success by collective bargaining in
this respect in the 1970's). By 1980, though, the "industrial democ-
E. Batstone, A. Ferner & M. Terry, Unions on the Board (1983).
"' Industrial Democracy (Cmnd. 6706, 1977).
188 Investors Chronicle (28 January 1977). For an excellent account, see Elliott, supra note
139; P. Brannen, Authority and Participation in Industry (1983) ch.6; Institute of Directors, The
Fifth Directive: A Trojan Bullock? (1980). For a summary, see Wedderburn, supra note 81 at
36-38.
187 Industrial Democracy, supra note 165.
168 Respectively, 0. Kahn-Freund, "Industrial Democracy" (1977) 6 Indus. L.J. 65 at 75-76;
P. Davies & K.W. Wedderburn, "The Land of Industrial Democracy" (1977) 6 Indus. L.J. 197 at
211.
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racy" debate in Britain was silent.
Some echoes of it still remain, for example the traces of Bullock
left in the archaeology of comparative studies on industrial democracy.
The majority Report even faced an issue which the legal systems of
Sweden and Germany have not confronted. It recommended that, for
the large companies to which the "2X + Y" board scheme would ap-
ply, company law should be amended to render certain decisions by
shareholders valid only if the mixed board of directors agreed. How
could a system of law that insisted upon the right of employees to have
representatives on the board permit a meeting composed only of share-
holders to resolve to liquidate the company? Secondly, the majority Re-
port insisted that there should be a "single channel" for workers' repre-
sentation both in collective bargaining and in structures of
representation within the company, and that channel must be the work-
ers' independent trade unions. This is the case in Sweden but not in
Germany. Problems of multi-unionism would be met by formation of a
"Joint Representation Committee" of unions within the company and,
more important, within the company group. This was one of the most
hotly contested points. It was represented as a bid for "Union Power."
But the proposals were not for nominees from union headquarters, but
for representatives elected through union machinery in the enterprise.
Moreover, the right to appoint to the board would not arise unless a
ballot of the employees declared clearly in favour of the scheme. If the
scheme were to depend on an employees' council or body outside the
union, that would be either a citadel to be occupied by union members
or a body in a state of tension with, or in hostility to, the union in its
collective bargaining role. The first rendered it pointless while the sec-
ond nullified the object of the exercise. Moreover, the proposal to stim-
ulate "Joint Representation Committees" of trade unions at enterprise,
company and company group level is one of which, in private, some
managers, and trade unionists too, now speak of as a missed
opportunity.
Trade union structure is fundamental to any such reconstruction
of the incorporated enterprise. Unless a union is independent, demo-
cratic, representative and effective it cannot enter the scene as the true
bearer of the trust of its members. That is why the Bullock Report also
stressed "the importance of employee representatives keeping in touch
with their constituents; if they do not, they will be of little use to the
board or to those they represent, for they will not provide the necessary
communication link between the two. This element of communication
was strongly entrenched in the Report. It was the point of contact be-
tween two different tendencies within the majority. The first reflected a
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belief in creating "a new relationship between capital and labour." Its
thinking was "unitary" in industrial relations terms; it saw the scheme
as gradually reducing, perhaps even abolishing, the basic conflicts of
interests in industry. The second tendency was based more squarely
upon an inevitable continuation of social and industrial conflict and saw
the scheme as transitional, being a phase of "conflictual partner-
ship." "  What held the two together in the majority Report was the
fact that neither tendency was millenialist, both saw the scheme they
were proposing as a step forward into new territory, but a step without
which Britain would be weaker in the economic travail which by then
seemed to lie ahead. Both believed that without such a step there was
no hope either of increased economic efficiency in the short-term or of
any new platform of consent and legitimacy in the medium term. Both
accepted the analogy - which, it is well known, came from Lord Bul-
lock himself - with which the Report ended. Proposals in the nine-
teenth century to extend the right to vote were met with fears little
short of "the subversion of the constitution and the dissolution of soci-
ety," yet these reforms were later perceived as essential to a stable and
prosperous society.
We believe that over 100 years later an extension of industrial democracy can
produce comparable benefits and that our descendants will look back with as
much surprise to the controversy which surrounded it as we do to that which
surrounded the extension of the political suffrage in the nineteenth century.
Many have noted that in ideological terms, opposition to the Bullock
scheme did not come only from management and that opposition to
workers participation in the enterprise at decision-making level was a
point held in common by both Marxist European unions and American
labour unions.170
Behind the proposals of the "Bullock" Report, however, lay three
social facts of the utmost importance. First, the trade union movement
was still accepted as broadly representative of British workers. This did
not mean that every worker was a union member (the "closed shop"
has always been a minority phenomenon in Britain), but by 1979, the
high point of membership, the density of union membership in Britain
was 54 per cent (it is still 50 per cent today) and nearly 80 per cent of
119 Davies & Wedderburn, ibid. in reply to the description of modern developments as "bar-
gained corporatism" by C. Crouch, Class Conflict and The Industrial Relations Crisis (1977).
170 See 0. Kahn-Freund, La Participation: Quelques Experiences Etrangbres (1976) at 27:
"II est remarquable de constater ici pour une fois une attitude fondamontale identique de la part
d'esprists inspir6s de la doctrine marxiste et, par exemple, des syndicats americaines. Cette atti-
tude est fond e sur la conviction que le conflit des inter~ts existe, qu'il ne peut disparaltre, que se
soit par la discussion ou par une organisation de 'enterprise."
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employees had terms and conditions covered by collective bargaining.
The strength of autonomous trade unionism, the method by which the
individual employee escapes from subordination to the employer, is a
key factor in any experiment with industrial democracy and recon-
structed corporate governance. Swedish structures cannot be under-
stood without the knowledge that some 80 per cent of white collar
workers and 95 per cent of other workers are union members. So too,
the inability of German unions to raise membership above 37 per cent
is central in that country; and the decline of union density below 20 per
cent of the workforce in the United States is of profound importance to
us all.
The second element was the fact that the great majority of British
trade unions have never been concerned with collective bargaining
alone. Their programmes have, with varying degrees of emphasis, long
included an economic and political challenge to the social structures in
which they work. This is a feature of all the major trade unions move-
ments of Western Europe, with the exception (some would argue) of
the DGB in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is a feature which
divides those trade unions by a chasm from the 'labour unions' of the
United States who do not mount a challenge to the political economy
within which they bargain, and it is a characteristic which continually
reasserts the justification of trade unions being in politics, which the
ILO has insisted to be necessary to their function of protecting the in-
terests of their members.
The third social fact was the acceptance of trade unions as a nec-
essary and desirable "estate of the realm." If this gave rise to "corpo-
ratism" in some periods, as in the Labour Government's "Social Con-
tract" of the later 1970's, it was also thought to establish a certain
consensus, a fundamental commitment to "full employment" and the
acceptance of limits beyond which government would not go in either
dismantling or extending the Welfare State; limits which, looking back,
we can now see were for the most part astonishingly observed by ad-
ministrations in the government of both parties between 1950 and
1980.
Since 1980, that is no longer the case. The commitment to "full
employment" has gone as have public policy as new perspectives on the
Welfare State. Deregulation and a return to free markets are perceived
as requiring a removal of the obstacles constituted by, or the "coercive
monopoly" of, trade unions171 These concepts of Hayek are now domi-
171 See F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty vol.1 (1979) at 142; vol. 3 at 144; The Con-
stitution of Liberty (1960) at 504; 1980's Unemployment and the Unions (1980) at 39-64.
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nant in the corridors of Whitehall. Legislation has reintroduced the lia-
bilities of the common law as the basis of a new labour law which as-
cribes to trade unions the rights - and illegalities - of 1901.172
Political activity by trade unions within the law is restricted and the
definition of "political" is enlarged, whilst the donation of funds by
companies for political purposes is, save for disclosure, unregulated.
Unemployment is 13 per cent of the workforce and still rising. Two
million full-time jobs have been lost in manufacturing industry since
1980. New jobs are invariably part-time or in self-employment. Half a
million young citizens under 21 years of age have never known gainful
work. But that is a story for another time. Its relevance here is that,
although a decade has not yet passed since the Bullock Report, its
pages speak as if from another world. It would be impossible to write
such a Report today, for the backcloth of necessary social consensus
appears to have been more fragile than expected. While many who
signed it expected, and wanted, social and economic change, few of
them could have predicted in 1977 the fragmentation - better, the
segmentation - of British society, and especially of the labour market,
which has occurred in the 1980's.
For those interested in worker participation, however, a study of
that other period is not irrelevant. For one thing, as dedicated an oppo-
nent of the Report as the Financial Times warned management in
1981 that workers' attitudes "bred mainly by fear of unemployment"
did not indicate "a permanent willingness to cooperate with manage-
ment decisions"; it was not arguing for "soft management," but "[the]
tide that swept the Bullock proposals on industrial democracy into a
major issue has not receded for ever."173 Whether or not that be cor-
rect, the conclusion of a research study for the Bullock Committee in
1976 summarises a view then widely held,
a consideration of the European experience of worker representation at board
level suggests that, to be even marginally effective as a meaningful form of in-
dustrial democracy, workers require parity representation on a meaningful board,
a formal recognition of their link with trade unions and a less restricted notion of
board secrecy. Without such conditions worker directors are trivial in democratic
terms.
Collective bargaining, it went on, with extended union rights to infor-
mation, appeared to be "a more adequate method" of securing workers'
rights in this period, but in the longer term, an introduction of board
172 p. Fosh & C. Littler, eds., Industrial Relations and the Law in the 1980's (1985); K.W.
Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (forthcoming 1986); J. Clark & K.W. Wedderburn, La-
bour Law and Industrial Relations ed. by K.W. Wedderburn, R. Lewis & L. Clark (1983) ch.6.
173 Financial Times (30 November 1981).
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representation could be "potentially important. 11 4 One lesson of the
British "industrial democracy" debate is that reform should not offer
more influence within the corporation than it can deliver.
Britain is not the only country to experience no new experiment in
"industrial democracy" in the 1980's. Indeed one can report few ad-
vances on this front from any country in Europe, except perhaps for the
introduction of a duty to bargain in France in 1982. True, the struc-
tures in Sweden and in Germany are intact, but elsewhere what had
seemed to be a slow and inexorable advance now has turned into a
defensive retreat. The reason had little to do with the law; nor has
there been fundamental change in the disillusion "with attempts at
achieving better corporate governance through increased shareholder
democracy.1175 The previous trend towards 'participation' and indus-
trial democracy, though, now appeared to be "the mark of Western
European economies in growth; it may not be thought remarkable that
the gale of recession should sweep these same socio-economic systems
back into a restrictive legal attitude towards the trade unions."17 6 In
this development, we must distinguish carefully "participation" from
"consultation." There is less participation by workers, but more consul-
tation of workers. It has been a phenomenon commonly observed in the
recession, in Britain and elsewhere, that management has increased the
extent of its "voluntary consultation" of the workforce, sometimes
through trade union machinery and sometimes outside the normal col-
lective channel of representation. Workers' participation in decision-
making is a very different animal in the labour relations zoo from con-
sultation of workers by a management which retains full discretion to
make the critical decisions. Indeed, consultation often comes after those
decisions have been made. Statutory backing for trade union rights to
participate in the implementation of management decisions, as in the
United States, does not therefore sustain 'industrial democracy' in the
way attempted by the Swedish Joint Regulation of Works Act, 1976.
On the other hand, more trade unionists in Britain now take a jaun-
diced view of participation. Far more reject participation on the com-
pany board which they regard less as an opportunity for joint regula-
tion than as an invitation to preside jointly over the redundancies of
their members. "Industrial democracy" may be a banner borne aloft
174 Batstone & Davies, supra note 162 at 43.
175 K. Hopt, "New Ways in Corporate Governance" (1984) 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1338; L.C.B.
Gower on company law "in disarray": "Whither Company Law" (1981) 15 U.B.C.L. Rev. 385.
178 K.W. Wedderburn, "The New Legal Framework in Europe" in Industrial Relations Soci-
ety of Australia, International Issues in Industrial Relations (1982) 34 at 56.
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more readily in booms than in recessions. When an economy, like the
British, is turned geriatric by decades of starvation of investment and
innovation, the maximisation of profit leaves little space for social
experiment.
Yet that is not the only lesson of these three decades of European
effort. An Australian Minister, pledging his government to a pro-
gramme of industrial democracy, said last year, "The essence of indus-
trial democracy is the right of employees to influence decisions affect-
ing their working lives. '117 The need of workers to reach decisions that
determine employment might be thought to become more urgent when
the danger to their very employment has grown so much larger. As the
threat of massive unemployment has grown however, the gaze of union
leader and union member alike has retreated from the horizons of new
societies, or even the middle distance of reform, back to the ground on
which they stand today. The traveller from Europe cannot report that
he has discovered a secure new social compact in which the managers
of private corporate power are found to be impressed with new trusts
which represent the interests of workers alongside those of sharehold-
ers. Yet it may not be irrelevant that amongst the many features which
he will have mapped are the two countries where the recession has not
bitten so deeply and where the social edifice appears so far to have
cracked less obviously than elsewhere, Sweden and Germany. There
one constituent (of course, it is only one) in social development was the
participation of workers' representatives in what were thought to be
elements of "industrial democracy" - something more than a token,
the beginnings of a redefinition of the corporation - which were laid
down sufficiently early before the current crisis. This he might report as
worthy of interest to any society which still had time and wealth
enough to discuss such issues, not least perhaps in the newly industrial-
ising countries of the Third World. Even in the balance sheet of Milton
Friedman an investment in "industrial democracy," if made in time,
might show a profit.
Indeed, it seems unlikely that the debate on "industrial democ-
racy" can, in the longer term, be divorced from that about the reform
of company law. The point has been reached in the United States
where reformers "need a perception of the particular problems that ex-
ist with corporation law today . . . . These goals must be stated ur-
gently . . . . A simple understandable statement must supplant 'gov-
ernance,' 'accountability,' 'legitimacy,' or 'flexibility' as a lodestar for
177 R. Willis, Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations, 1984, Employee Participa-
tion News No. 3 at 8.
1985]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
corporation law reform." This, it is said, implies that it should "adopt
the goal of shareholder protection, not just in the sense of protecting
property but also with a view toward restoring integrity to, and belief
in, the investment process."' 78
But to European eyes such a programme omits a fundamental is-
sue, namely, the legitimacy of the distribution of powers achieved by
incorporation with limited liability as it affects the workers whose la-
bour power is purchased. It was the gradual insertion of worker-partici-
pation on to the agenda of company law reform, as part of the law of
the enterprise, which has linked the debates about "industrial democ-
racy" with the modern form of the old question: "For whom are corpo-
rate managers trustees?" The narrow issue that links corporations,
trust and the workers was and remains:
What are the modern conditions ... on which private capital in a mixed econ-
omy can be allowed the privilege of incorporation with limited liability?""8
V. A POST-SCRIPT
To this conclusion, a post-script must be added, one which
Maitland could not have foreseen, and which we still imperfectly un-
derstand, but which is an immediate issue in all societies ("an interna-
tional fact of life," the Watkins Task Force called it in Canada in
1968).18o It cannot be adequately discussed here, but it must be men-
tioned. Our traveller would be obliged to report that it is one to which
very few of the programmes of reform, either in corporate governance
on the American pattern or on industrial democracy in the European
style, have addressed themselves effectively. The most important char-
acteristic of capital today is its international character. Most of the
important corporate groups are multinational. Transnational capital is
strong; it crosses oceans and frontiers with ease. Transnational labour
power is weak; each nation's labour movement flourishes in the web of
its proud but separate history. Transnational collective bargaining
scarcely exists.181 The Netherlands found it necessary to exempt the
178 Branson, supra note 124 at 112.
179 K.W. Wedderburn, Company Law Reform (1965) at 19.
'80 Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, Foreign Ownership and the Structure
of Canadian Industry (1968).
181 See P. Davies, "Labour Law and Multinational Groups of Companies" in K. Hopt, ed.,
Groups of Companies in European Law (1982); D. Kujawa, "The Labour Relations of United
States Multinationals Abroad" (1979) 4 Labour & Society 3; K.W. Wedderburn, "Multinational
Enterprise and National Labour Law" (1972) 1 Indus. L.J. 12; H. Northrup & R. Rowan, Mul-
tinational Bargaining Attempts (1979); R. Blainpain, Comparative Labour Law and Industrial
Relations (1982).
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companies of transnational enterprises from its laws on industrial de-
mocracy. It is true that such international agencies as the OECD, ILO
and the United Nations have tried to elaborate codes of conduct for
these organisations, but they can hardly be called effective control or
engines of accountability. The difficulties posed by the different codes
of national company law and their interaction with multinational cor-
porations have as yet scarcely been even defined in relation to such
codes. For example, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises raise in every paragraph the question of the liability of a parent
company for the subsidiary at home and abroad.182
The conflict between the theoretical and formal legal independence of subsidiar-
ies and the reality of extraterritorial control by foreign holding companies affects
almost every group and remains essentially unresolved. 183
We may now have entered an "environment dominated by vast imper-
sonal organisations that pride themselves on their rootlessness, the 'in-
ternational corporation'." They have "helped create enormous wealth"
but they have also,
broken down traditional community links and brought forth new problems whose
solutions require protective and control mechanisms - private, governmental, lo-
cal, national, and international - that do not now exist. Governments have grown
large and potent along with large firms, but they continue to lose the power of
initiative in a world of increasingly rapid change, international mobility of re-
sources, and internal political conflict and stalemates .
8 4
Before we have produced answers to the governance of the na-
tional corporation, or have constructed the terms of some transitional
trust for the exercise of national corporation powers, or have found a
way by which political democracy in nations can be complemented by
industrial democracy, the difficulties raised to the power of an interna-
tional economy where the initiative lies with those who wield corporate
power largely on their own terms. The lawyer, then, who confronts such
problems today, in making his analysis and proposals on a national or
regional plane, must aim further to make a contribution which will at
least open up the international agenda. It is a daunting prospect.
However, there are precedents, found in unlikely places. On Feb-
ruary 15, 1850, Lord Shaftesbury, having learned of an interpretation
182 See International Investment: OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Cmnd.
6525, 1976) esp. at 5-6 on Disclosure of Information; K. Simmonds, ed., Multinational Corpora-
tions Law, vol. 3 (1978). See also the Tripartite Declaration of Principles regarding Multina-
tional Enterprises (1977 ILO).
18- T. Hadden, The Control of Corporate Groups (1983) at 4 (a pioneering study).
184 Herman, supra note 72 at 301: "The hope for the future must be that a series of surviv-
able small shocks or minor catastrophes will occur".
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by the judges of the Court of Exchequer which wrecked the Ten Hours
Act, passed to protect women and children enslaved in factories wrote
in his diary: "Adverse judgement in the Court of Exchequer . . .Ten
Hours Act nullified. The work to be done all over again." 18  A century
and a quarter later, in the development of transnational capital and an
internationalised economy, history may have already nullified even the
inadequate projects of reform which have so far attempted to expand
industrial citizenship by imposing new trusts upon the giant corporation
and to give to those who sell their labour power new levels of democ-
racy at the workplace. If that be so, the work must begin all over
again. After all, women and children in most of the industrialised coun-
tries do not now work in factories for more than ten hours in the day.
185 J. Wesley-Bready, Lord Shaftesbury and Social-Industrial Progress (1926) at 236.
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